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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOPROSPECTING: A MODEL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Aman Gebru* 
Society has long enjoyed the benefits of medical advances. In 
numerous cases, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
(biopharmaceutical) industries build on knowledge accumulated 
over centuries by traditional communities. As in the case of aspirin 
and morphine, the use of this knowledge has reduced the time and 
cost it takes to develop new drugs. Despite the community’s 
contribution, the law only provides rights to the person or firm that 
produces a medical product or service at the end of the process of 
discovery. Information about the knowledge that allowed these 
medical advancements to develop rarely comes to the forefront, and 
this creates tension between source communities and 
pharmaceutical companies. The controversy surrounding the 
involvement of Pfizer and Unilever in research into weight loss 
products based on the Hoodia plant used by the San people of the 
Kalahari Desert for centuries as an appetite suppressant is a prime 
example of potential problems with the current system.1 The tension 
that arises in this relationship is whether source communities have 
any claim emanating from their input in the modern drug 
development process. 
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 1 ABENA DOVE OSSEO-ASARE, BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 
PLANTS IN AFRICA (2014). 
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This article asks whether legal intervention is necessary to 
regulate the relationship between the knowledge-holder 
communities and users of traditional knowledge (“TK”)—the know-
how, skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous people and 
local communities. Answering in the affirmative, this article then 
addresses the question of what form of legal protection is justified. 
After describing the key problem and situating TK within the public 
goods literature in the first part, the second part of the article 
examines four of the major channels through which the production 
of knowledge goods is supported. These include public investment, 
private investment, secrecy and group cooperation. Because these 
channels have their own advantages and disadvantages, the article 
argues that a combination of these frameworks is needed to respond 
to the diverse interests of the multiple stakeholders involved. These 
alternative frameworks should consider the full spectrum from a 
simple right of attribution to a ‘communal right’ requiring prior 
consent before TK is accessed. Part three then proceeds to outline 
the nature and scope of a ‘communal bioprospecting right’ for 
source communities. The bioprospecting right would be based on 
the disclosure of TK in a publicly accessible or restricted database. 
The article concludes by outlining what the nature and scope of TK 
codification should be and considers some of the implications that 
flow from the proposed model legal framework. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Biopharmaceutical firms involved in bioprospecting, which is 
the process of using plant and animal species to develop new drugs, 
often use the knowledge of indigenous people and local 
communities2 to make the process more efficient. The input that 
indigenous people and local communities provide to 
biopharmaceutical firms is beneficial in reducing the time and cost 
involved in modern drug development, at least in the initial stages 
of the process. If a successful drug is developed, the inventors of the 
drug are rewarded through patent rights that give the inventor a right 
                                               
 2 While the term “indigenous peoples” is used in the literature to refer generally 
to native populations who live with settler communities, the term “local 
communities” is used in reference to communities that reside in countries from 
which colonizing powers have left, but in which the community continues to be 
secluded from the mainstream society in that country. 
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to exclude others from making and using the protected invention.3 
The knowledge that indigenous peoples and local communities 
developed over generations is considered to be part of the “public 
domain” free of encumbrances. There is no legal requirement or 
business practice in which attribution is given or benefits flow back 
to the source communities. In response to this status quo, source 
communities and governments of countries in which a significant 
indigenous population resides are increasingly taking a protectionist 
stance. The governments of Brazil, India, and China, for example, 
have enacted laws restricting access to the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge within their borders.4 This creates a potential 
risk in which the bioprospecting relationships cannot be sustained in 
the long term. Biopharmaceutical firms involved in these 
relationships face public relations crises when they are accused of 
engaging in unfair practices. While some accusations may be 
justified, some firms face these allegations because of the lack of 
clarity in legal frameworks or the expectation of interested 
shareholders. Compounding this problem, TK and genetic resources 
on which it relies face an alarming rate of loss. Since the early 1990s, 
there have been several domestic and global initiatives attempting 
to encourage the conservation of biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge.5 
A previous publication6 has outlined these two problems and 
examined the rationale for legal intervention. The publication 
                                               
 3 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (noting that patent rights in the US grant the patentee 
of a product the right to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and import the patented 
product). 
 4 Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional 
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 757–76 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome Reichman 
eds., 2005) (outlining national legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, 
Peru, the Philippines, and the Africa model legislation). 
 5 Charles McManis, Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge 
Protection: Law, Science and Practice, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 5 
(2007). 
 6 Aman Gebru, International Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge: From Cultural Conservation to Knowledge Codification, 
15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. TRADE L. 293 (2015). 
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concludes by noting that the codification and disclosure of TK 
should be a key rationale for legal intervention. This article builds 
on the discussion by outlining a model legal framework based on 
property rights that balances the interests of source communities and 
has the potential to facilitate bioprospecting partnerships. Part I 
starts with the Hoodia story to help introduce the issues that might 
arise in bioprospecting projects. It summarizes research showing the 
value of TK and the alarming rate at which the knowledge is 
disappearing. The section concludes by situating TK within the 
public goods literature and describing the problem from a welfare 
economics perspective. Part II outlines four major alternative 
channels that support the production of knowledge goods and 
examines the potential and limitation of each channel to encourage 
investments in TK. It analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of 
government provision, private rights, secrecy, and group 
cooperation in encouraging source communities to invest in 
codifying their knowledge and disclosing it to outsiders. Because of 
the diverse worldviews and interests among stakeholders, the article 
advocates for the combination of these frameworks to govern 
bioprospecting relationships. 
Since the recognition of private rights plays such a major role in 
the governance of modern knowledge, Part III of the article outlines 
a detailed model legal framework based on a “communal 
bioprospecting right.” The purpose of granting the bioprospecting 
right is to address the key “tragedies” outlined in the article—the 
TK loss and the rising protectionist trend. The right can be expected 
to encourage investments in the codification and disclosure of TK 
thereby saving the knowledge from loss. This “incentive to codify”7 
rationale has two sides: the supply side and the demand side. On the 
supply side, the regime encourages knowledge-holder communities 
to codify and disclose their knowledge. On the demand side, it 
encourages entrepreneurs who want to help knowledge-holder 
communities in codifying and disclosing their knowledge to invest 
in that process. Economic efficiency would require the granting of 
rights so long as it is efficient and necessary to meet these purposes. 
                                               
 7 Id. 
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The right would arise out of two types of databases in which 
source communities codify their TK: a publicly accessible database 
and a restricted database. A publicly accessible database would give 
source communities one of two alternative rights: an exclusive 
bioprospecting right or a right to share profits arising out of the use 
of their TK. A restricted database, the contents of which are kept 
confidential, would give source communities a right against 
unauthorized access. Part III concludes by proposing factors that 
should be considered in setting the breadth and term of the 
bioprospecting right. Parts IV to VI examine the nature and scope of 
TK codification and its implications for the different stakeholders 
involved. The article suggests the adoption of a holistic codification 
reflecting the availability of resources which will increase the value 
of codified TK for both the firms and source communities. 
A. The Hoodia Story8 
The San people, a community featured in the 1984 hit film “The 
Gods Must Be Crazy,” are a group of hunter communities around 
the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa.9 The San people chew on 
parts of the Hoodia plant to help them suppress their appetite when 
they go on long hunting trips.10 While the San people and other 
neighboring communities have been using the Hoodia plant as an 
appetite suppressant for at least a couple hundred years, its use was 
not studied scientifically in detail until the 1980s when the Center 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), an agency of the 
South African government, began a project to study the plant.11 After 
decades of study and several trials, the center was able to isolate the 
active ingredient responsible for appetite suppression and named the 
compound P57.12 In 1995, CSIR was granted its first patent in South 
Africa for the appetite suppressant qualities of the active elements 
                                               
 8 For a detailed discussion of five of the most famous cases of the use of 
traditional medicinal knowledge in modern drug discovery, including the use of 
the Hoodia plant, see generally OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1. 
 9  Id. at 167. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. at 168, 170. 
 12 See id. at 187–88. 
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extracted from the Hoodia plant.13 Patent grants from other 
jurisdictions soon followed, including in the US and EU.14 In 
exchange for payment, CSIR entered into licensing agreements with 
private companies including Phytopharm, Pfizer, and Unilever.15 
These firms invested millions of dollars in research and 
development for a weight loss product from the Hoodia extract.16 
When the public heard news of the Hoodia extract patent, 
activists, academics, and non-governmental organizations began 
advocating for the sharing of profits related to P57 with the San 
people. In response, the South African San Council and the Working 
Group of Indigenous Minorities in South Africa (WIMSA) 
established a jointly managed trust where some funds from the sale 
of Hoodia plant would be deposited.17 WIMSA thereafter brought 
legal action against CSIR, and, in a settlement agreement, CSIR 
agreed to pay 8% of milestone payments and 6% of the royalty 
payments from P57 into the trust.18 In May 2005, CSIR paid 
R560,000 South African Rand into the trust, which they planned to 
spend on education and other projects that would create jobs for the 
San people.19 
While the San people were hoping to share profits from P57, the 
marketing process hit a roadblock.20 Producing a marketable product 
from the Hoodia extract proved much more challenging than 
anticipated.21 Pfizer terminated its license in 2003 because of the 
                                               
 13 Rachel Wynberg, Case Study 7: Access and Benefit-Sharing Agreements in 
the Commercial Development of Hoodia, in CBD TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 38: 
ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN PRACTICE: TRENDS IN PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS 
SECTORS 83, https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-38-en.pdf; see also 
South African Patent No. 983170. 
 14 WIPO, CASE STUDY: HOODIA PLANT (2008), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/academy/en/about/global_network/educa
tional_materials/cs1_hoodia.pdf; see also Int’l Patents Nos. US6376657, 
GB2338235, and WO9846243 
 15 WIPO, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 16 See OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189; WIPO, supra note 14, at 2. 
 17 OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 191. 
 18 OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 192; WIPO, supra note 14.  
 19 OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 192. In current currency exchange, R560,000 
South African rand would be approximately $ 42,218 USD. 
 20 See OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189. 
 21 See id. at 189–90. 
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challenges and high cost associated with synthesizing and extracting 
P57.22 In 2008, Unilever ended its license because of adverse side 
effects of the compound.23 CSIR, however, continues to conduct 
research on the Hoodia plant, and now Hoodia-based products have 
become ubiquitous in the dietary supplement market.24 
The Hoodia story shows the relationship between the various 
stakeholders in the use of TK, the complexities of using this 
knowledge in the drug discovery process, and potential solutions. 
Before analyzing these issues, however, it seems necessary to first 
define the term “traditional knowledge.” 
B. Defining Traditional Knowledge25 
Scholars have yet to agree on a universally accepted definition 
of TK.26 However, there is sizable literature on its value, protection, 
and conservation.27 The term traditional knowledge is given narrow 
                                               
 22 Wynberg, supra note 13, at 83. 
 23 OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189. 
 24 WIPO, supra note 14. 
 25 Although defining the key and complex terms in this paper is necessary to 
provide a coherent and detailed analysis, it should be noted that the practice of 
defining terms such as “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous peoples,” and “local 
communities” is highly controversial. Some indigenous peoples and local 
communities find the process of defining these terms as part of a bigger problem 
of disempowerment, especially when the definition dissects concepts and values 
they consider to be holistic. See WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. 
PROP. AND GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/9, LIST AND BRIEF TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
VARIOUS FORMS IN WHICH TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE MAY BE FOUND (2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_17/wipo_grtkf_ic_17_in
f_9.pdf; see also Maeli Astruc, Indigenous Peoples Present Their Perspectives on 
Traditional Knowledge at WIPO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2014), 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/25/indigenous-peoples-present-their-
perspectives-on-traditional-knowledge-at-wipo/. 
 26 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & 
GENETIC RES. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/8 
ELEMENTS OF A SUI GENERIS SYSTEM OF PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, 
(2002). 
 27 See generally PETER DRAHOS & SUSY FRANKEL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S 
INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT (2012); 
CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: 
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(sensu stricto) and broad (sensu lato) scopes in the relevant 
literature.28 In its narrow sense, the term refers to the know-how, 
skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous peoples and local 
communities.29 The broader definition of the term includes 
traditional “know-how,” but it also extends to cultural expressions 
such as folklore, music, dances, and artistic creations.30 This article 
adopts the narrower version of the term because a narrow definition 
allows for a detailed and coherent analysis and because it is the most 
frequently used definition in literature.31 Therefore, for the purposes 
of this article, the term TK refers to the know-how, skills, practices, 
innovations, and learnings of indigenous peoples and local 
communities. It should be stressed, however, that the definition of 
the term TK is highly contentious, with multiple approaches being 
adopted by source communities and scholars working in the field.32 
It must be noted at the outset that the term “traditional” is not used 
to connote its antiquity.33 Instead, “traditional” refers to the way the 
knowledge is developed, used, and shared.34 While modern 
                                               
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 
(2006). 
 28 See OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 21. 
 29 WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. AND GENETIC RES., 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9, TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE: OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, Annex III at 5, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_3/wipo_grtkf_ic_3_9.pdf. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate 
Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional 
Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & 
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
 32 For a list of definitions adopted by scholars, see WIPO, supra note 25. 
 33 Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: A Road 
Under Construction, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 244 (2007). 
 34 See Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential 
Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 521, 524 (Jerome Reichman & 
Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). 
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knowledge uses evidence-based investigation, TK is characterized 
by trial-and-error methodologies and intuition.35 
A variety of adjectives are frequently appended to “knowledge” 
in this context, including “indigenous,” “traditional,” 
“native/aboriginal,” “local,” and “informal.”36 The term “indigenous 
people” refers to people (including their descendants) who were 
colonized by European powers in countries where the colonizing 
population remains the dominant group.37 While some scholars limit 
their definition only to the knowledge of indigenous peoples, others 
argue that the term should be expanded to include local 
communities. For instance, Chidi Oguamanam argues that because 
of the many similarities between the knowledge that indigenous 
peoples and local communities hold, the term should include 
knowledge held by communities in Africa and Asia that have seen 
the withdrawal of colonial powers.38 In this sense, TK would refer 
to the know-how, skills, practices, and innovations of “indigenous 
peoples . . . and . . . to members of the so-called local communities 
or non-Western cultures, be they indigenous in the strict sense or 
not.”39 
“Indigenous knowledge” and “knowledge of local 
communities” share common features relevant for the discussions in 
this article, and, therefore, in this article, the term TK is used to refer 
to the know-how, skills, practices, and innovations of both 
                                               
 35 The trial-and-error approach, as opposed to a formalistic and technical 
approach, is one in which the traditional knowledge or wisdom is slowly 
developed through the experiences of generations of community members. 
Although each community has its own way of building on the knowledge that is 
passed down from elders, some of the common mechanisms include through 
stories and songs that communicate the ways in which resources in the 
surrounding environment could be used for food, health needs, shelter, navigation 
etc. See Carvalho, supra note 33, at 244 (listing the four elements of TK including 
the fact that it based on “trial-and-error” approach); Reichman, supra note 31, at 
356. 
 36 OGUAMANAM, supra note 27. 
 37 Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual 
Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS ENTERTAIN. L.J. 
37, 48 n.25 (2009). 
 38 OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 22. 
 39 Id. at 20–26. 
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indigenous peoples and local communities. Thus, the focus is on the 
isolation of communities from mainstream societies. The term 
“users,” on the other hand, refers to diverse groups of individuals or 
firms with differing backgrounds and interests (commercial or non-
commercial) that use TK to further their goals. 
In the face of this complex group of stakeholders, it is helpful to 
clarify the focus of this article. The literature on the protection of 
TK uses the term “protection” in two ways: defensive and positive. 
Defensive protection seeks to stop non-indigenous people from 
claiming intellectual property (IP) rights40 over TK.41 For instance, 
traditional medicinal knowledge (TMK) could be used to invalidate 
non-innovative patents through disclosure of the TMK to patent 
examiners.42 Most attempts at defensive protection are not 
contentious as they seek to improve the existing IP system. The 
other mode of TK protection—positive protection—is more 
controversial, as it aims to provide knowledge-holding communities 
with the power to control how their knowledge is used by 
outsiders.43 This article will focus on the positive mode of 
protection. 
C. The Value of Traditional Knowledge 
TK may be useful in two ways: first, as an independent body of 
knowledge that indigenous and local communities use, and second, 
                                               
 40 The term “intellectual property rights” here refers to the rights that are 
granted over scientific, literary, and artistic creations that are the subject matters 
of patents, copyrights and trademark rights. 
 41 WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. AND GENETIC RES., 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/8, DEFENSIVE 
PROTECTION MEASURES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GENETIC 
RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: AN UPDATE (2003), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_6/wipo_grtkf_ic_6_8.pdf. 
 42 The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, which has documented thousands of 
Indian TMK, has been used by patent offices around the world to invalidate non-
innovative patents. See TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY ("TKDL"), 
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Home.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Oct. 
29, 2017). 
 43 VERA SHRIVASTAV, PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE 
EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: DEFENSIVE AND 
POSITIVE APPROACH (July 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463017. 
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as an input for the production of goods and services in modern 
industries. This article is concerned with the use of TK as an input 
in modern industries. One of the best examples of this type of value 
is the use of TMK in the modern drug discovery process. Thus, 
TMK will be used as an example throughout this article. 
Various sources have examined the role TMK plays in modern 
medicine. For instance, one study revealed that in the context of 
plant screenings, the use of TMK increased the chances of getting a 
preliminary hit44 from 6% (without the use of TMK) to 25% (with 
the use of TMK).45 This means that in the initial stages of research, 
scientists would have a considerably higher chance of selecting a 
compound with an active ingredient from a collection of plants. 
Other research has revealed the predictive role that TMK plays in 
drug discovery.46  In one study, 80% of the drugs tested were used 
to treat the same ailments in both modern and traditional medicine.47 
These statistics, however, do not mean that 80% of drugs are derived 
from TMK. Although challenged by some, the value of TMK in 
modern drug discovery has repeatedly been demonstrated. The 
information provided through TMK would complement the 
scientific process at least in the sample selection stages. For 
instance, TMK has played a significant role in the attempt to find a 
cure for AIDS: 
                                               
 44 “Preliminary hit” is the compound that is selected from a large number of 
compounds because of either its phenotype or process which is relevant for the 
disease being researched. The compound would still have to go through validation 
and other tests in the drug discovery process. See Benoit Deprez & Rebecca 
Deprez-Poulain, Hit-to-Lead: Driving Forces for the Medicinal Chemist, 4 CURR. 
TOP. MED. CHEM. i, i (2004); Rebecca Deprez-Poulain & Benoit Deprez, Facts, 
Figures and Trends in Lead Generation, 4 CURR. TOP. MED. CHEM. 569–80 
(2004). 
 45 Michael Balick, Ethnobotany and the Identification of Therapeutic Agents 
from the Rainforest, in BIOACTIVE COMPOUNDS FROM PLANTS 22, 28 (D. J. 
Chadwick & J. Marsh eds., 1990). 
 46 See C. Haris Saslis-Lagoudakis et al., Phylogenies Reveal Predictive Power 
of Traditional Medicine in Bioprospecting, 109 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 15835–
40 (2012). 
 47 Daniel S. Fabricant & Norman R. Farnsworth, The Value of Plants Used in 
Traditional Medicine for Drug Discovery, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., 69, 71–
72 (2001), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1240543/.  
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In a field study in the rain forest in Belize, Dr. [Michael] Balick [director 
of the Institute of Economic Botany at the New York Botanical Garden] 
compared using a random collection of plant species with an 
ethnobotanical approach, in which only the plants that local people say 
have medical uses are collected. [ . . . ] 
Of the 20 plants collected on the shaman’s advice, five killed the AIDS 
virus but spared the T cells. But of 18 plant species gathered randomly, 
just one did so.48 
The implication is that consulting a shaman increases the 
chances of a scientist producing a cure from 5.56% to 25%. 
Although much more research and development may be required to 
enhance TMK beyond its traditional use, the role TMK plays is 
crucial. Similarly, one can imagine that other types of TK, such as 
traditional agricultural knowledge (“TAK”) and traditional 
environmental knowledge (“TEK”), would have significant value as 
input in modern research. 
D. The Tragedy of Traditional Knowledge 
Although TK holds considerable value, the body of knowledge 
is diminishing rapidly. Anthropologists and other researchers have 
been sounding the alarm on the distressing rate of TK loss. “For 
instance, research by Victoria Reyes-García and her colleagues has 
revealed that between the years 2000–2009, the loss of TK related 
to the use of plants among Tsimane` Amerindians (an Amazonian 
community) ranged ‘from 9% (for the female subsample) to 26% 
(for the subsample of people living close to towns).’49 The 
researchers identified that TK loss is higher in communities living 
close to cities than those in remote villages.”50 The increasing 
urbanization of rural communities spurred by globalization can only 
be expected to increase the rate of TK loss. TMK especially seems 
                                               
 48 Daniel Goleman, Shamans and Their Lore May Vanish with Forests, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 11, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/11/science/shamans-
and-their-lore-may-vanish-with-forests.html. 
 49 Victoria Reyes-García et al., Evidence of Traditional Knowledge Loss Among 
a Contemporary Indigenous Society, 34 EVOL. HUM. BEHAV. 249, 249 (2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3837211/. 
 50 Aman Gebru, The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Searching 
for the Minimum Consensus, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 42, 44-45 
(2017); id. at 252. 
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to be facing a high rate of loss. Dr. Mark Plotkin, an ethno-botanist 
at Conservation International, worries that knowledge of how to use 
medicinal plants may be disappearing, stating “[w]e often talk about 
disappearing species, but the knowledge of how to use these species 
is disappearing much faster than the species themselves . . . [t]he 
knowledge that’s being lost most rapidly is information on healing 
plants.”51 
Several factors contribute to this dramatic rate of TK loss, 
including socio-economic and environmental pressures.52 For 
example, the environmental pressures that destroy the biodiversity 
resources that certain indigenous peoples rely on for survival will 
inevitably increase the rate of loss of the knowledge associated with 
such biodiversity. Similarly, political ostracism and denial of access 
to traditional lands will also add to the alarming rate of TK loss. 
Consequently, a multi-pronged approach is necessary to address the 
problem of TK loss. 
This article, however, will focus on two problems that add to the 
rate of TK loss: first, the predominance of oral transmission of TK 
among indigenous peoples and local communities, and second, the 
rising protectionist trend in which source communities are 
increasingly restricting access to TK in response to the absence of 
legal and practical control mechanisms. Although multiple factors 
drive TK loss, it seems that the combination of lack of codification 
and a rising protectionist trend plays a unique role. 
1. Predominance of Oral Transmission 
One of the core features of TK is that it is orally transmitted from 
one generation to the next through kinship and personal 
relationships.53 This is not to say, however, that there is no codified 
TK: South Asian TMK such as Ayurveda and Unani are good 
                                               
 51 Goleman, supra note 48. 
 52 See Reyes-García et al, supra note 49, at 255. 
 53 John K. Githae, Potential of TK for Conventional Therapy: Prospects and 
Limits, in GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THE LAW: 
SOLUTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 77, 78 (Evanson C. Kamau & 
Winter Gerd eds., 2009). 
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examples of documented TK.54 However, systematically codified 
TMK seems to be the exception rather than the rule. The 
transmission of TK, and more particularly TMK, is usually made 
through kinship relationships and cultural initiations.55 
The oral nature of TK lies in stark contrast to modern knowledge 
in which a culture of systematic documentation and dissemination 
is the norm.56 This culture of documentation is observable in various 
aspects of modern communities. For instance, in the academic 
setting, which is one of the core channels of knowledge production 
and dissemination, “publish or perish” has been the custom since at 
least the early 20th century,57 highlighting the pressure on researchers 
to externalize their knowledge for disclosure and wide 
dissemination. Intellectual property laws—which function as the 
main legal tools for regulating the production, use, and 
dissemination of inventive knowledge goods—are filled with 
documentation requirements.58 Examples include the disclosure 
requirement59 under patent laws and the copyright law requirement 
that expressions be fixed in a tangible medium.60 The absence of a 
similar culture of codifying knowledge among indigenous peoples 
and local communities plays a key part in increasing the rate of TK 
loss. While the knowledge of modern societies continues to exist 
through books and other mediums of documentation, a considerable 
portion of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ knowledge 
disappears with the communities. 
                                               
 54 See WIPO, Inventory of Existing Online Databases Containing Traditional 
Knowledge Documentation Data, at 6, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6, (May 10, 2002). 
 55 See Carvalho, supra note 33, at 244. 
 56 OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 14. 
 57 See generally Lindley J. Stiles, Publish-or-Perish Policies in Perspective, 
XVII J. TEACH. EDUC. 464 (1966). 
 58 Documentation plays a key role in patent and trademark rights, and 
documentation of literary and artistic works provides the copyright owner with 
stronger claims. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq. (2012). 
 59 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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2. A Rising Protectionist Trend 
Exacerbating the problem of TK loss is a rising protectionist 
trend in which source communities and megadiverse countries61 take 
measures to restrict access to TK and genetic resources. This trend 
seems to have been a response to the lack of effective legal 
protection for TK and genetic resources. A few scholars have 
noted,62 albeit in passing, that there has been an increase in domestic 
legislation restricting access to TK and genetic resources in 
megadiverse countries. Biodiversity-rich countries of the Global 
South and many knowledge-holder communities see the lack of 
legal protection as unfair. The protectionist trend adds to the 
alarming rate of TK loss resulting from the predominantly 
uncodified nature of TK. 
This protectionist trend should be worrying because increased 
access to TK and genetic resources, not increased restriction, is 
beneficial to collaboration and innovation in the bioprospecting 
field. Increased access is what close to two hundred countries of the 
world agreed to when they signed the Convention on Biodiversity 
(CBD). However, recent trends seem to show a disturbing trend 
towards increasing restrictions. As Charles McManis observes, the 
CBD 
[s]timulated a wave of national legislation having the effect (whether 
intended or unintended) of restricting, rather than facilitating, access to 
genetic resources in the developing world, pending the industrialized 
world’s adoption of a meaningful benefit-sharing measure.63  
Restrictions on genetic resources would mean restricted access 
to TK because of TK’s close linkage to genetic resources, and most 
national legislative acts also mention restrictions on access to TK 
                                               
 61 “Megadiversity” refers to the state of a locality in which it is host to a 
disproportionately high level of biological diversity. The uniqueness of a species 
to a certain country—endemism—is at the heart of the method used in 
determining which countries are megadiverse. Mega-diverse countries make up 
close to 70% of the biodiversity in the world. Megadiverse Countries, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.biodiversitya-z.org/content/megadiverse-countries (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2017).  
 62 See Carvalho supra note 33; Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 4, at 757–76 
(outlining national legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, the 
Philippines, and the Africa model legislation.). 
 63 McManis, supra note 5, at 5. 
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concurrently. The status quo in bioprospecting relationships will not 
be sustainable if this trend continues and more megadiverse 
countries legislate to restrict access. 
In addition to national restrictions, there are some attempts by 
indigenous and local communities to keep TK secret. For example, 
the various religious or cultural ceremonies by shamans that hold 
traditional medicinal knowledge are effective in concealing the 
knowledge from members of their own indigenous and local 
communities. These attempts may have limited effect in keeping a 
given medicinal plant and medicinal knowledge secret from a 
trained scientist who has the knowledge and skill to identify and 
investigate therapeutic plants. Although some of these attempts to 
keep TK secret fail, other measures may be created that will become 
effective in restricting access. If governments and communities in 
megadiverse countries are determined to limit access to TK, they 
could do so by putting restrictions on traveling to such sites. Some 
communities successfully keep their knowledge secret through 
geographic and social barriers.64 
The fact that megadiverse countries take a protectionist stance 
on genetic resources and TK may not necessarily be troublesome. If 
such measures were effective in allowing either the source countries 
or communities to use the knowledge in producing products and 
services for the public, such an approach would have functioned 
similarly to trade secrets in modern industries. However, source 
countries and communities do not have the capacity to use TK in 
such a way, and such uses of TK have not been reported to date. 
Additionally, there is a real risk that TK held in secret might be lost 
before it is transmitted or used because of the lack of TK 
codification. In those instances, both the TK holders and the public 
lose. In the absence of use, codification, or disclosure, this 
knowledge base will be lost to the communities and cultures that 
preserved it for ages. 
                                               
 64 Doris Estelle Long, Trade Secrets and Traditional Knowledge: 
Strengthening International Protection of Indigenous Innovation, in THE LAW 
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
495 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandberg eds. 2011). 
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In summary, the lack of systematic documentation among many 
knowledge-holder communities contributes significantly to the 
tragedy that TK faces, especially when combined with the 
protectionist trend, and other factors such as the continued 
destruction of knowledge-holder communities and their biodiversity 
resources. This lack of investment in the codification of TK, despite 
its considerable value, may seem paradoxical. This is made even 
more complex by the rising protectionist trend. From the perspective 
of global public welfare, more access to TK and genetic resources is 
better rather than increased restrictions. The section below frames 
these issues within public goods literature to better understand the 
problem of TK loss and rising protectionism, and to find potential 
solutions. 
E. Traditional Knowledge as a “Public Good” 
Public goods in economic literature are non-rivalrous (i.e., 
goods that could be consumed by one person without reducing the 
ability of another to consume the same good) and non-excludable 
(i.e., goods from which the producer cannot extract benefits).65 
Knowledge is commonly considered to be a public good and is at 
times labeled “the quintessential public good.”66 For decades, 
economists have noted the public-good nature of knowledge.67 
Sharing one’s knowledge with another does not lessen the amount 
of knowledge consumed by each person, and once knowledge is 
disclosed to the public, it is usually difficult, costly, or impossible 
                                               
 65 See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS (3rd ed. 1992). 
 66 Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 46, 47 (Jerome Reichman & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). 
 67 See, e.g., Joseph H. Vogel, From ‘the Tragedy of the Commons’ to the 
‘Tragedy of the Common Place’: Analysis and Synthesis Through the Lens of 
Economic Theory, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Charles McManis ed., 2007); 
RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS: THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE 2 (2005), http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources 
__ID=444946&T=F (last visited Nov 27, 2014); Joseph Stiglitz, Knowledge as a 
Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, & Mark A. Stern eds., 
1999). 
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to exclude those who do not pay from accessing the knowledge. The 
public-good nature of knowledge is, for instance, one of the core 
rationales behind the granting of intellectual property rights over 
certain inventions and expressions.68 
As defined in the introductory section, TK refers to the know-
how, skills, and practices of indigenous and local communities.69 
Like other information goods, TK could be enjoyed simultaneously 
by different parties, and once disclosed to outsiders, it would be 
impossible to exclude them because it is a public good with non-
rivalrous and non-excludable features. Because of its public-good 
nature, TK faces risks similar to those facing other information 
goods: most relevant, a risk of market failure caused by the reduced 
capacity of the “producer” to appropriate the benefits of the good 
(the inappropriability problem). While one could help prevent the 
loss of TK by investing in its codification and disclosure, once the 
knowledge is disclosed the investor would not have the ability to 
distinguish those who pay to use the knowledge from those who 
access it without authorization. 
While government intervention is sometimes required to address 
inappropriability problems with public goods and produce such 
goods at optimal levels, there are times in which public goods are 
produced (sometimes at optimal levels) despite being non-
excludable.70 The following section discusses the potential and 
limitation of some common channels for the production of modern 
knowledge71 to incentivize investments in the codification and 
disclosure of TK. “Investment in the production of a good” in public 
                                               
 68 While there are several alternative ways of encouraging investments in the 
production of public goods, intellectual property rights are one of the key channels 
through which knowledge production is encouraged. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex 
Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 
129, 129 (2004). 
 69 See supra Section I.B. 
 70 See Varian, supra note 65, at 414–15. 
 71 Although there is no clear and distinct way to define “modern” knowledge, 
the paper is using these terms to refer to know-how that does not fit in the 
definition of TK outlined under section I.B above. In this sense, “modern” 
knowledge would refer to know-how that is in the mainstream system of modern 
knowledge governance defined by systemic inquiry and extensive documentation. 
The terms “modern” and “Western” are used interchangeably in the literature. 
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goods literature is referred to in this article as investing in the 
“codification and disclosure of TK.” 
II. ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS FOR ENCOURAGING 
INVESTMENT IN TK 
Knowledge goods in the modern world have been produced 
through different channels. These channels include government 
investment/subsidy, recognition of private rights, secrecy, and 
group cooperation.72 While there are other channels that support the 
production of knowledge goods, these four channels are the most 
relevant for the production of knowledge goods in general and TK 
in particular. 
A. Government Provision 
Government provision is a major channel for the production of 
knowledge goods. A considerable portion of knowledge production 
in universities, government agencies, and research institutes is 
publicly funded and contributes significantly to socio-economic 
development.73 Government investment in infrastructure for the 
production of knowledge goods is essential to sustain modern 
knowledge.74 Similarly, government supply or subsidy may be 
necessary for the codification and disclosure of TK; the TK 
codification attempts initiated by governments in some countries are 
good examples of this need. The governments of India,75 China,76 
                                               
 72 See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the 
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 303 (2013). 
 73 Additionally, governments set up prize systems in which quality research and 
publication is rewarded through a competitive process. Researchers, with the hope 
of receiving the financial reward and social recognition that comes with winning 
the prize, may be willing to invest their resources in addressing such problems. 
Some government funds have eligibility requirements that are used to direct 
research into areas of special public interest. See Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes 
Replace Patents - A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. 
J. SCI. TECH. L. 25, 25–26 (2007). 
 74 See Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 311. 
 75 See TKDL, supra note 42. 
 76 See Yanling Sun, Introduction to China TCM Patent Database, STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (June 17, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/export/ 
sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/china.pdf. 
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South Korea,77 South Africa,78 and Venezuela79 have invested 
considerable financial and human resources to collect, organize, 
document, and manage TK within their jurisdictions. 
Despite the potential of government investment/subsidy in 
supporting the codification of TK, there are issues that could limit 
this potential.80 One major limitation is the fact that TK is a global 
public good that crosses borders easily. Knowledge that is supplied 
or subsidized by one government could be used by entities outside 
that country. Without a global system that recognizes such 
contributions, the producing country may be unable to control the 
uses of such knowledge.81 This scenario would involve a free-rider 
problem which could in-turn reduce the incentives of governments 
to invest in TK codification and disclosure. Discussing “modern” 
knowledge production in general, the Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz rightly argues that the global free-rider 
problem (in which some countries will try to benefit by taking from 
                                               
 77 See Jeongyoon Choi, Introduction of Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal 
(KTKP), KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_tkdl_del_11/wipo_tkdl_del_11_re
f_t9_4.pdf. 
 78 Biffy van Rooyen, Safeguarding the Future of Indigenous Knowledge 
Through ICT, 5 SCIENCESCOPE 24, 25 (2011); Catherine Saez, South Africa to 
Launch National Traditional Knowledge Recording System, INTELL. PROP. 
WATCH (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/05/10/south-africa-to-
launch-national-traditional-knowledge-recording-
system/?utm_source=weekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=alerts. 
 79 WIPO, supra note 54; Stanford Zent & Eglee L. Zent, On Biocultural 
Diversity from a Venezuelan Perspective: Tracing the Interrelationships Among 
Biodiversity, Culture Change and Legal Reform, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 91, 
105 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007).  
 80 Government investment in the provision of TK may include investments in 
infrastructure or in investing in the codification of TK itself. See TKDL, supra 
note 42; Sun, supra note 76; Choi, supra note 77. 
 81 In fact, developing countries pushed for the signing of the Nagoya Protocol 
because they were unable to enforce access and benefit sharing requirements set 
out in their law against users in developed countries. See Linda Wallbott, 
Franziska Wolff, & Justyna Pozarowska, The Negotiations of the Nagoya 
Protocol: Issues, Coalitions and Process, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC 
RESOURCES: ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING AFTER THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 33, 
41–52 (Sebastian Oberthür & G. Kristin Rosendal eds., 2014). 
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the global pool of knowledge, without contributing their share to it) 
is cause for concern.82 He states that this free-rider problem might 
limit the initiative of some governments to fund global public goods, 
and posits that the establishment of a global entity that would 
manage investments in the production of knowledge might help 
optimize investments in global knowledge generation.83 
This global free-rider problem is particularly stark in the case of 
TK and genetic resources. While most TK and biodiversity 
resources are found in the global South, users of such knowledge are 
predominantly based in the global North where the necessary 
technological advancement and skill is found.84 Therefore, an 
investment by countries in the South for the codification of TK will 
face a significant free-rider problem because firms residing in 
countries of the North will be able to benefit from such codification 
without sharing the cost. In fact, the risk of free riders seems to be 
behind the restrictive measures taken by the TK codification 
initiatives in the TK source countries, noted earlier, whose projects 
are oriented towards defensive protection (i.e., using the contents of 
the databases to stop others from claiming patent rights based on 
such knowledge).85 Access to such databases is provided in a highly 
restricted manner to patent examiners for the sole purpose of patent 
examinations.86 Even if there are “open” databases, they are limited 
to local uses within the community or the country.87 Because of the 
                                               
 82 Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 320–21. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Wallbott, Wolff, & Pozarowska, supra note 81, at 41. 
 85 TKDL, supra note 42 (India); STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF 
THE P.R.C. http://www.sipo.gov.cn (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (China); China 
Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database Search System, STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE PRC, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_iptk_bkk_09/wipo_iptk_bkk_09_t
opic5_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2017); Choi, supra note 77 (South Korea); 
Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal, KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OFFICE, http://www.koreantk.com/ktkp2014/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
 86 Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, U.S.-India 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (Copy with author); Traditional Knowledge Digital Library 
(TKDL) Access Agreement, Eur.-India, (Copy with author); Ministry of Sci. & 
Tech., India and Japan Sign TKDL Access Agreement, PRESS INFO. BUREAU (Apr. 
20, 2011, 6:53 PM), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=71713. 
 87 See Saez, supra note 78. 
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lack of active use of these databases, their potential to enhance 
global social welfare (for instance in bioprospecting88 projects) is 
currently not being realized. 
A collaborative initiative will be able to solve this inefficient 
state of affairs. It has been noted that citizens of countries in the 
Global North benefit considerably from the continued availability of 
TK and biodiversity resources predominantly sourced from the 
Global South.89 This fact should justify a requirement that the North 
invest in TK codification initiatives taking place in the South in 
some form. Since benefits that citizens of countries in the Global 
North receive from TK and biodiversity resources in the South are 
diffused benefits, it is reasonable that the governments of the Global 
North should support TK codification in the South in the same way 
funds collected through taxes are used for diffused public benefits. 
Thus, the real potential of TK is realized in situations where the 
North and South collaborate to bring together their comparative 
advantages to increase global access to TK. In the same way that 
production of modern knowledge requires a global framework for 
optimal production and use,90 this challenge calls for a legal 
intervention at both the domestic and international levels. 
Yet another limitation that could explain the failure of 
government provision of TK is the political and social tension that 
may exist between knowledge-holder communities and the 
governments under which they exist. Although such tension exists 
in the case of many local communities, it is heightened in the case 
of enclave territories in which indigenous communities are usually 
                                               
 88 “Bioprospecting can be defined as the systematic search for and development of 
new sources of chemical compounds, genes, micro-organisms, macro-organisms, and 
other valuable products from nature.” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TRIPS, CBD 
AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINES: CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS. REPORT OF AN ASEAN 
WORKSHOP ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE (2001), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh2996e/6.3.html. Bioprospectors use genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities to in 
their research. Id. This can be contrasted with the alternative method of producing 
synthetic compounds or screening samples of genetic resources for active ingredients 
without the use of traditional knowledge. Id. 
 89 See generally Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the 
Politics of Plants’ Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZO J. INT. COMP. L. 585 (2003). 
 90 Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 320–21. 
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marginalized by settler communities. As a result, proposals for 
government supply or subsidy of TK might be highly limited in 
some instances. In cases where TK holders trust foreign entities 
more than their governments, market provision might be more 
effective in encouraging investment in TK than government support. 
In the same way that government supply or subsidy is 
complemented by the market in modern knowledge production, TK 
needs a complementary source. Although government investment in 
the infrastructure and substantive codification of TK is promising, it 
faces considerable limitations that should be addressed through 
other channels, such as the encouragement of private investments. 
B. Recognition of Private Rights 
The recognition of private rights has encouraged investments in 
production and dissemination of modern knowledge.91 Intellectual 
property rights have arguably encouraged private investments in the 
production and dissemination of know-how, at least in some 
industries.92 Following such measure, advocates of TK protection 
suggest that recognizing private rights in TK would encourage 
knowledge-holder communities and/or outsiders to invest in the 
codification and disclosure of TK.93 Recognition of a private right 
would address the inappropriability problem by artificially making 
TK excludable. The public goods nature of TK would be limited, 
thereby encouraging private investment in the codification and 
disclosure of TK. This can be expected to encourage the investment 
                                               
 91 Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1009–12 (2008). 
 92 While the impact of intellectual property rights in encouraging innovation is 
highly debated, industries that involve considerable R & D investment and 
produce outputs that can easily be copied seem to benefit the most. For example, 
the pharmaceutical industry responds to the granting of patent rights. See 
generally Kendall W. Artz et al., A Longitudinal Study of the Impact of R&D, 
Patents, and Product Innovation on Firm Performance, 27 J. PRODUCT 
INNOVATION MGMT 725, 728–37 (2010) (discussing the effects of R&D spending 
and patents in announcement of new products in multiple industries including in 
the pharmaceutical industry). 
 93 OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 6–7; CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION 
AND PROMOTION OF TRADITIONAL MEDICINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2002),  http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs 
/pdf/s4917e/s4917e.pdf. 
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of considerable financial resources and expertise that users of TK, 
such as biopharmaceutical firms, hold in TK codification and 
disclosure. Carefully crafted private rights could be granted to 
knowledge-holder communities to enable them to enter into 
collaboration with TK users. 
There are two ways in which proponents of property rights 
approach the issues. The first proposes to protect TK under a 
“property rule,”94 while the second is to protect TK under a liability 
rule.95 Under such framework, users would be allowed to use TK 
without asking for consent from TK holders. If and when the use of 
TK results in a successful product, users are required to compensate 
TK holders. Such compensation usually takes a form of profit 
sharing. Given the diversity of interests among stakeholders on the 
use and dissemination of TK, the adoption of different alternative 
property rights regimes is suitable. While in some situations 
requesting consent from rights holders may be feasible, in other 
scenarios, the multiplicity of rights holders could render a property 
rule regime ineffective. 
However, the recognition of private rights is not without its 
limitations. Since the recognition of private rights encourages self-
interested private actors, users may only be interested in investing 
in TK that has a readily available commercial value. This may result 
in the neglect of TK that does not have a readily available 
commercial value but which may prove to be valuable in the future. 
To address this shortcoming, TK codification and disclosure should 
be supported by public sources of funding, including government 
subsidy and altruistic grants. 
C. Secrecy  
Secrecy is a common channel for the production and use of 
valuable knowledge by private firms. Scholars have recently pointed 
                                               
 94 A right protected under a property rule would give the right holder the power 
to exclude others from using the right. Injunction could be granted against those 
that violate such right. Whereas, a right protected under a liability rule only gives 
the right holder the right to be compensated. 
 95 Reichman & Lewis, supra note 31, at 337–38; Jerome Reichman, Of Green 
Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1777–78 (2000). 
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to the potential of trade secret law as a protection mechanism for 
TK.96 The core assumption in such a scenario is that the knowledge 
producer has the capacity to keep knowledge from being accessed 
by competitors or the general public. At least in the case of TMK, 
attempts by TK holders to keep the knowledge secret seem to be the 
trend rather than the exception. The use of spiritual and cultural 
ceremonies during the use of TMK and the strict personal 
relationships that seem to dominate the transfer of TMK from 
healers to apprentices imply that knowledge-holder communities 
have attempted to keep TK secret.97 Such attempts, at least among 
some indigenous communities, are mechanisms of TMK 
appropriation intended to prevent its disclosure to outsiders.98 
However, some of these measures, such as bundling TMK with 
religious ceremonies, might not be sufficient to restrict access to 
TMK by outside users as experts in the use of plants for 
bioprospecting may distinguish between a ceremonious procedure 
and one intended to extract healing elements.99 As a measure to 
effectively exclude outsiders, some indigenous groups refuse to 
communicate their knowledge and ceremonies with outsiders.100 
To effectively keep TK a trade secret, knowledge-holder 
communities would need to expend significant resources to create 
physical or institutional structure that excludes outsiders or legal 
expertise to enforce confidentiality when violations occur. Most 
TK-holder communities will lack such resources. Therefore, 
keeping outsiders from accessing TMK does not seem to be a 
feasible route to encourage investments in TMK codification and 
disclosure. 
More importantly, however, stopping outsiders from accessing 
TK is not a global welfare enhancing solution, i.e., it would still 
mean that the general public would not benefit from, for instance, 
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cheaper drugs. Even if knowledge holders are successful in keeping 
TK secret, it does not guarantee that the alarming rate of TK loss 
would be stopped. In fact, secrecy, combined with pressures that 
continue to destroy the social, economic, and environmental 
structures of knowledge-holder communities, could increase its rate 
of loss. For instance, reports from ethnobotanical projects frequently 
state that in many communities only elders and traditional healers 
have access to TMK and that when elders and traditional healers die, 
their knowledge dies with them.101 The fact that access to TMK in 
many communities is a privilege reserved only for elders and 
traditional healers means that TMK will be lost forever if it is kept 
secret in the face of these socio-economic and environmental 
pressures disrupting the structures that support its use. Some 
common examples of these pressures include policies of cultural 
assimilation or “modernization,” restrictions on access to ancestral 
lands, and destruction of ecosystems on which source communities 
rely. 
Furthermore, most knowledge holders do not have the capacity 
to develop pharmaceutical products to meet national or global 
demand. As a solution, it is possible to license a trade secret to firms 
that have the capacity to meet the demand for such products. 
However, licensing without any recognized rights over such a secret 
is risky, due to the chance of confusion on the scope of the license, 
and the lack of legal guidance that parties may find. Negotiating 
over uncodified knowledge will also make it harder for parties to 
draft contracts. These risks might explain the lack of successful 
collaborations. Firms in such industries have the capacity to keep 
the knowledge secret while at the same time being able to 
commercialize it on a global scale. In contrast, knowledge-holder 
communities will have a very limited capacity to use their 
knowledge while ensuring its secrecy. 
D. Group Cooperation 
In intellectual property literature, there are examples of norm-
based systems through which knowledge goods are produced by 
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high-end chefs102 and stand-up comedians103 in the absence of legal 
intervention. The social sanctions of being ostracized are at times 
sufficient to deter chefs and comedians from stealing recipes and 
punch lines. Norm-based systems, such as the production of 
knowledge goods through group cooperation, provide alternative 
channels for the production of the public goods of knowledge. When 
norm-based systems are used, members of a community would be 
expected to invest in research and development, i.e., the production 
of knowledge goods, despite the absence of (or despite reduced) 
incentives in terms of direct personal gain. Norm-based systems, 
however, seem to require close relationships among community 
members and repeated interactions in order for social sanctions 
against deviations to be effective. 
These scenarios work because of the close social ties members 
of such communities have with each other and with their audience, 
which make the social sanctions effective. It could be claimed that 
the close social ties that have historically existed among members 
of knowledge-holder communities created and sustained the norm-
based regulations that worked for the use of TK within the 
community. 
However, TK users do not have close ties with knowledge-
holder communities in the same way high-end chefs and stand-up 
comedians do. Therefore, TK-holder communities would not be able 
to use social sanctions against users who violate those sanctions in 
another part of the world. For example, the San people of the 
Kalahari Desert would not be able to use social sanctions against 
firms that were involved in attempts to produce a pharmaceutical 
product from the Hoodia plant. The firms involved (Phytopharm, 
Pfizer, and Unilever) do not have close social ties with the San 
people, and there may not be repeated interactions between these 
stakeholders. Thus, the San people would be unable to set up a 
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successful social norm of access and benefit-sharing with 
pharmaceutical firms, research institutions, and the clients of such 
firms in distant locations. Because TK usually crosses political, 
cultural, and economic boundaries, its regulation through group 
cooperation as used by chefs and other close-knit societies is 
improbable. 
A “knowledge commons” type of institutional set-up may have 
some potential. This system would involve self-governing entities 
formally or informally organized under a clear statement of rights 
and responsibilities of the members of the commons. A good 
example of a “knowledge commons” is a patent pool in which patent 
holders in a certain industry cross-license their patent rights to make 
it easier to produce products requiring multiple patent inventions. 
The members of the patent pool agree on the terms of the commons 
such as membership and scope of rights. Many successful 
knowledge commons involve parties that have legally recognized 
and enforceable rights.104 Although informal self-governing 
knowledge commons have the potential to facilitate bioprospecting 
partnerships, the absence of a defined legal backdrop and the 
considerable power imbalance between stakeholders 
(biopharmaceutical firms and source communities) may affect the 
success of a TK commons. However, the potential for a knowledge 
commons approach requires a detailed study to assess its potential 
and limitations. 
E. Other Channels 
Other alternative channels for the production of knowledge do 
not seem to be promising in the case of TK. For example, TK does 
not involve as high a cost of copying as in the case of technologically 
advanced knowledge.105 Therefore, the deterrence from copying that 
exists in advanced industries does not apply to TK. The first-mover 
advantage, or lead time advantage, that applies in advanced 
industries emanates from a breakthrough invention to which 
competitors do not yet have access to. In the case of TK, because of 
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its incremental nature, it seems unlikely that such channels would 
bring about a sufficient commercial advantage necessary to 
encourage investment in TK codification and disclosure. 
From the analysis of alternative channels provided above, the 
recognition of private rights seems to hold a strong potential to 
encourage private actors to collaborate with TK-holder communities 
in the codification and disclosure of TK. This does not mean that it 
is the only channel that should be adopted. In fact, the recognition 
of private rights will need to be supplemented by public investment 
and secrecy in order to address the urgent and complex problem of 
TK loss. While the adoption of a diverse approach is encouraged, it 
seems necessary to provide a detailed examination of what a 
“private rights” alternative could look like as a TK governance 
framework. Thus, the following sections are devoted to outlining 
how such a channel could be applied in the case of TMK. 
III. A COMMUNAL RIGHTS BASED FRAMEWORK: ONE OF 
MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES 
In a consultative workshop on TK, Graham Dutfield, a leading 
scholar in international IP law, suggested that because of the 
diversity of interests involved in TK protection, what is needed is a 
“buffet of rights” rather than one uniform regime.106 The 
bioprospecting right described in the following section is just one 
option in a buffet of rights that could be used to address the complex 
issue of TMK protection. It should also be noted that the proposed 
mechanism is a voluntary system with respect to knowledge-holder 
communities and it is plausible that some communities might not 
want to participate in the system for various reasons. Other 
mechanisms, such as keeping TK secret and contracting with users 
regarding access,107 could also be implemented to address the 
concerns of communities who prefer to opt out of the proposed 
regime. 
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A. Definition and Purpose of the Bioprospecting Right 
The bioprospecting right proposed in this article is a cluster of 
rights that emanate from bioprospecting activity based on TMK. 
Depending on the type of TMK database, it includes an exclusive 
right to conduct bioprospecting, a right to share profits of 
bioprospecting over TMK codified in a publicly accessible database, 
or a right to receive compensation for unauthorized bioprospecting 
on TMK codified in a restricted database. The right will be granted 
to source communities that codify their TMK either in a publicly 
accessible database or in a restricted database to which a 
government agency or other entity could access. The two types of 
databases and rights emanating from them are discussed in detail in 
section III.D.1 of this article. 
The purpose of granting the bioprospecting right is to encourage 
the codification and disclosure of TMK. This “incentive to codify” 
rationale has two sides: the supply side and the demand side. On the 
supply side, the regime encourages knowledge-holder communities 
to codify and disclose their knowledge. On the demand side, it 
encourages entrepreneurs who want to help knowledge-holder 
communities in codifying and disclosing their knowledge to invest 
in that process. Economic efficiency would require the granting of 
rights so long as it is efficient and necessary to meet these purposes. 
B. Core requirements 
While it may be relatively easier to make a case for the granting 
of rights to source communities, the scope and conditions of these 
rights are the more contentious aspects. In order to craft a workable 
framework, parameters must be set which outline the steps needed 
to receive legal protection. This is necessary to ensure that the 
system works to encourage codification and disclosure without 
discouraging follow-on innovation. In this regard, the following four 
requirements should be put in place under the bioprospecting right. 
First, the applicant must either be the knowledge-holder 
community, a representative of the community, or a person who has 
received Prior Informed Consent (PIC) from the knowledge-holder 
community. Here, one can imagine that source communities will 
have legal representation through which the community’s 
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relationship with outsiders is handled. If the applicant is a member 
of the knowledge-holder community, customary laws of that 
community should govern internal issues of ownership and 
application. But if the applicant is an outsider, there is a need to 
ensure that the applicant has obtained proper consent from the 
knowledge-holder community. Such a requirement is necessary to 
reverse the protectionist trend, in which TK holders are becoming 
increasingly restrictive in providing access to their TK and genetic 
resources. Allowing anyone to receive rights over TMK without 
receiving consent from knowledge-holder communities will further 
encourage a protectionist trend and affect the sustainability of the 
bioprospecting industry. These are the very scenarios the proposed 
regime seeks to avoid. 
To facilitate relationships between knowledge-holder 
communities and outsiders interested in applying for TMK 
codification, it is advisable to establish guidelines for how consent 
is received from a knowledge-holder community. These guidelines 
could outline recommended procedures and minimum standards 
with the goal of safeguarding the system from abuse and providing 
clarity and security to the parties involved. The Nagoya Protocol,108 
which was signed to explain the Convention on Biodiversity, calls 
on member countries to establish standards for the “prior informed 
consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and local 
communities” (PIC) in access to genetic resources and associated 
TK.109 Since the goal in the bioprospecting right proposed in this 
article is to empower TK-holder communities and to create the 
confidence needed to codify TK, the effective consent of TK-holder 
communities is essential. Therefore, the jurisdiction in question 
should develop a suitable framework through which outsiders could 
receive the effective consent of TK holders. 
Second, the applicant, if not a representative of the knowledge-
holder community, must have entered into a benefit-sharing 
agreement with the knowledge-holder community. As with PIC, a 
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guideline that outlines certain minimum standards might help 
facilitate the relationship and protect knowledge-holder 
communities against abuse by sophisticated knowledge users. The 
Nagoya Protocol and its annex on “monetary and non-monetary 
benefits” call for the “fair and equitable” sharing of benefits under 
“mutually agreed terms.”110 This framework could be used as a base 
to build an equitable benefit sharing guideline. Source communities 
could, however, negotiate for more terms and conditions than those 
listed in the minimum standards. Reference to other licensing 
regimes would be helpful here as a reference point. Legal 
representation will also be helpful here. Each jurisdiction should 
ensure that TK holders receive a “fair and equitable” share of the 
benefits in agreements they enter into with licensees. Setting 
minimum standards and conditions may help in this regard, and it is 
necessary to avoid a repetition of the negative past experience where 
indigenous and local communities entered into agreements without 
understanding the nuances and implications of the agreement.111 
Third, the application must clearly specify the scope of the 
knowledge being claimed. It goes without saying that the knowledge 
that is expected to receive legal protection will have to be clearly 
stated. This is necessary for the purposes of codification, disclosure, 
and enforcement of rights. Without a clearly stated scope, users will 
not know if they are infringing upon a right or what rights they are 
infringing upon. Intangible properties are inherently difficult to 
define compared to physical properties, which has physical limits. 
Therefore, clearly specifying the scope of TMK over which legal 
protection is sought is even more essential than is the case with 
physical property. 
The level of disclosure and enablement required by patent laws 
should not, however, be required in the case of TMK. Traditional 
healers and members of the knowledge holding community may be 
unable to specify TMK in the way a scientist would be able to 
describe an invention.112 A system of protection which adopts a 
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patent-like specification requirement risks being unworkable. 
Carvalho suggests setting up an easy requirement for the disclosure 
of “minimally enabling” information—information that would 
enable another person to comprehend what the knowledge-holder 
community does and how to replicate it.113 A requirement of 
enabling disclosure along the lines of such standards might suffice 
for the proposed system. 
Fourth, the knowledge claimed must not already be widely 
diffused. The more that knowledge is diffused, the harder it is to find 
the community from which it originated for the purpose of assigning 
rights. The cost of locating the originating community and the 
uncertainty surrounding the question of which community to consult 
may discourage significant follow-on innovation. However, this 
requirement begs the question of how diffused TMK has to be before 
it is no longer able to receive protection. This is a hard question to 
address, and it may be impossible to set a clearly defined line. 
Instead, it may help to specify certain standards such as the ability 
of the applicant to produce evidence demonstrating the origins of 
the knowledge. Practicality would require the granting of protection 
to cases in which claimants produce satisfactory evidence 
supporting the community as the source of that TMK. Ultimately, 
courts would have to draw the contours of protectable TMK and that 
which is too diffused to belong to the applicant (claimant). 
In regard to diffused knowledge, it should be noted that some 
TMK could be held by more than one community. This could be a 
result of historical connections between the communities or 
independent discovery. Multiple origins for the same or similar 
TMK might create challenges for the proposed system of TMK 
protection. It may also increase the costs of users in deciding which 
community to consult. However, it is possible to respond to such 
situations through innovative flexibilities. For example, a “joint 
ownership” type of right could be granted to multiple communities 
that can prove to have created and developed the TMK. TMK 
databases would also be able to facilitate the establishment of joint 
rights. 
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C. Applying the Bioprospecting Right: The Goodya Plant 
Since the previous sections provided the core requirements of 
the proposed bioprospecting right, a hypothetical case may be a 
useful tool to help explain these features. The case of the Goodya 
plant is provided to show what the scope of the right may be and 
what a narrow and broad scope of TMK codification could look like. 
*** 
The Fan people—a community in a remote corner of the world—
use the Goodya plant to treat depression. Before this traditional 
treatment begins, the patient must first undergo a three-week 
training in which she learns all the spiritual songs of the Fan people 
and a dance called Hammer. The ritual for the treatment is only 
conducted on top of Mount Dashen—the highest mountain in the 
Fan people’s traditional territory—and is held after sunset because 
the spirits of ancestors are the strongest at such time. The Goodya 
plant grows on top of the mountain during the spring season. All 
adult members of the Fan people are required to attend the 
ceremony. The patient will sit in the center of the group while the 
Conga—the traditional healer—stands next to the patient, fully 
adorned in face-paintings and a ‘garment of the wise men.’ Other 
members of the community sit in circles around the patient. The 
patient’s family forms the first circle, and close friends will form the 
second circle. Each circle represents the person’s closeness with the 
patient. 
The ceremony takes two hours. The first part of the ritual takes 
approximately an hour in which the patient leads the group in a 
chant progressively increasing with intensity. When the traditional 
healer believes the patient is ready the second part of the ritual 
begins. 
This is when the Conga, with the help of his first-born son, makes 
the patient drink a beverage made of the Goodya plant. The juice is 
made with a mixture of spices and an extract of the fruits and leaves 
of the Goodya plant. The healer picks the Goodya leaves and fruits 
when they are still green, he dries them in the sun and grinds them 
into a powder. The powder is boiled for approximately half an hour 
before it is left to simmer an hour longer. The healer then pours the 
mixture into a clay pot which is custom made for this mixture. The 
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mixture is kept for three weeks in underground storage before it is 
reheated for use a few hours before the ceremony. After the patient 
drinks the reheated mixture, she joins the rest of the community in 
the Hammer dance in which the spirits of ancestors are expected to 
join. The patient is expected to drink the Goodya mixture daily for a 
full week. The healer checks in with the patient every night to see 
the progress she has made. Friends and family are also expected to 
visit the patient during this healing week. 
*** 
If the Fan people were interested in receiving protection under 
the proposed bioprospecting right, they would codify and disclose 
their knowledge through an agency established for this purpose. The 
Conga or the chief may be authorized to act as a community 
representative under the customary law of the Fan people. Thus, 
either the Conga or the chief would be the contact person in the 
process of TMK codification and disclosure. The Fan people could 
also choose to enter into an agreement with a firm that could 
undertake the codification and disclosure of TMK. This agreement 
would have to fulfill the first core requirement of the 
bioprospecting—that of Prior Informed Consent114 of the Fan people 
as set out in the Nagoya Protocol. 
Determining what types of uses infringe upon the bioprospecting 
right and which uses are legal will be challenging. Here, it may be 
helpful to adopt the “substantial reliance” test suggested by William 
Fisher.115 According to the test, source communities would have 
rights against users who relied substantially on TMK in the 
production of inventions, products, and processes.116 It is 
acknowledged that the substantial reliance standard is a vague one 
that does not give sufficient direction regarding what types of uses 
will amount to infringement.117 However, the vagueness is necessary 
to allow the proposed mechanism to cover the diverse ways in which 
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outsiders use TMK. The court or other entity adjudicating the claim 
of infringement of a bioprospecting right would examine all the 
evidence and decide if the user relied on TMK to such a degree that 
it is a “substantial use.” The simple act of a user obtaining access to 
codified TMK should not be considered substantial reliance on such 
knowledge, but situations in which the use of TK enabled users to 
save time and/or resources in the production of the final product 
should usually be considered to meet the substantial reliance test. 
Additionally, substantial reliance should also be found in cases in 
which the use of TK changed the research direction significantly in 
a way that enabled users to produce a successful product. 
Since courts currently engage in similar exercises in enforcing 
patent laws, they could develop jurisprudence regarding the 
appropriate parameters of substantial reliance. The doctrine of 
equivalents allows courts to decide that an act “substantially 
similar” to the patented invention infringes if it does “substantially 
the same function, in substantially the same way, to yield 
substantially the same result.”118 Acts that are substantially similar 
to those stated in the patent claim would be considered 
infringements. The substantial reliance standard in TK use could 
also be developed by courts in the same way that they developed the 
doctrine of equivalents. In the hypothetical case provided above, the 
Fan people will have the rights outlined below (see Section III.D.1) 
against users who relied substantially on the codification of TMK 
related to the Goodya plant. 
The third core requirement of the bioprospecting right may help 
in the above-discussed analysis. The documentation of TMK must 
clearly state what the knowledge is in as much detail as possible.119 
In the case of the Goodya plant, the documentation should provide 
the traditional and scientific name of the plant, how the plant is used, 
and the expected effects of the plant. Further discussion on the 
nature and scope that TMK codification should take is provided in 
Section III.D.1 below. 
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The final core requirement is that the knowledge should not 
already be widely diffused.120 Any part of the codified knowledge of 
the Goodya plant, the procedures followed in providing treatment, 
and its ability to treat depression would not be under the exclusive 
right of the Fan people if any of this is already widely diffused. A 
challenging task here is determining how diffused TMK has to be 
before losing its ability to be protected under the proposed system. 
This challenge becomes even more essential given the prevalence of 
multiple communities holding variations of similar TMK. The fact 
that another community uses the Goodya plant and its procedures to 
treat depression should not exclude it from protection. If these 
communities are found in close proximity to one another, yet still 
both secluded from mainstream communities, there is still value in 
protecting this knowledge in order to encourage its codification and 
disclosure. The two communities could be considered co-owners. 
However, the more mainstream the communities are, i.e., the closer 
they are to ‘modern’ lifestyles, the more communities there are that 
potentially hold the knowledge, and the narrower the scope the 
bioprospecting right should be. In other words, based on the 
substantial reliance standard, the more diffused a TMK is, the less 
that users rely on TMK from one community. If users did not rely 
substantially on a codified TMK, then bioprospecting rights cannot 
be claimed. 
For instance, if communities neighboring the Fan use a different 
species of plant that has the same family as the Goodya plant, the 
Fan people’s bioprospecting right could be limited to the use of the 
Goodya plant and the other community could have rights over other 
types of plants they use to treat depression. If a community 
documents one variety or species of the plant, and the user firm 
conducts research on another variety with more promising potential, 
the source community’s right depends on how much the firm relied 
on the first variety/species to understand the value of the second 
plant variety/species. This is because a community could only claim 
the part of TMK codification that the community holds to the 
exclusion of the outside world. Similar to the issue of infringement, 
this issue would also have to be addressed through courts or 
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legislation. However, attempts should be made to establish co-
ownership when communities hold the same or similar TMK in 
order to facilitate its use by outsiders and the benefit-sharing 
process. 
D. Scope of the Bioprospecting Rights 
Following the discussions regarding the conditions of the 
bioprospecting right, the scope of such right is the other key issue 
that needs to be resolved. Economics literature suggests that 
exclusive rights on knowledge goods increases the cost of follow-
on innovation and can deter it altogether.121 Therefore, the granting 
of exclusive rights over such goods should be justified through the 
innovation-enhancing effects of such rights. The welfare gains from 
an increase in the rate of invention—caused by the incentive of 
gaining a right—should be greater than the deterrence of follow-on 
innovation.122 It is not an easy task to investigate the correct scope 
of protection that would encourage optimal codification and 
disclosure; however, an attempt should be made to carve out a 
justifiable scope and balance the interests of knowledge-holders, 
users, and the general public. The optimal scope, in terms of 
economic efficiency, of such a right is that which encourages the 
maximum codification and disclosure of TMK by knowledge-
holders without overburdening follow-on innovation. 
It is challenging to determine what the optimal scope of a 
bioprospecting right should be to achieve the goal of encouraging 
optimal TMK codification and disclosure. To date, there is no 
agreement on the optimal scope of intellectual property rights.123 
Any attempt to establish an optimal scope for TMK is only made 
harder because the market has not yet fully responded to TMK.124 
The exact scope of the right will be greatly affected by the policy 
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objective of the country adopting the regime.125 Although there are 
bound to be differences in scope from one country to another, there 
are nonetheless core factors that should be considered in setting the 
scope of bioprospecting rights. Policy makers setting up the 
proposed regime will have to consider which factors to prioritize 
based on the jurisdiction’s interests. 
The scope of a bioprospecting right could be described in terms 
of its breadth and length. The breadth of the right relates to what the 
right holder will be able to rightfully claim. Breadth outlines the 
scope of the bioprospecting right within which rights and 
obligations arise. The length of the right refers to whether the right 
expires, and if so, at what time and under what conditions. Different 
scopes of the bioprospecting right can be expected to have different 
effects in encouraging applicants to codify and disclose TMK. It can 
be expected that the larger the scope, the more that applicants would 
be encouraged to invest in TMK codification. However, the scope 
should also not overly reward applicants with a right which is 
unjustifiably broad. 
1. Breadth of the Bioprospecting Right 
The breadth of the bioprospecting right relates to the limits of 
the right within which the right holder has legally protected 
interests. In contrast to rights over physical property, the limits of 
rights over intangible property are harder to define. Despite this 
challenge, the law has been able to set out legal “fences” that set out 
the breadth of rights over intangible property.126 Here, it may be 
beneficial to draw an analogy to similar types of protection in patent 
law. A patentee receives the exclusive right to make, use, and sell 
the patented invention.127 The breadth of a patent right depends on 
the specific claims that are approved by the patent office.128 Users 
                                               
 125 It should be noted here that countries that have a record of mistreating their 
indigenous population may not be receptive to a strong scope of protection. The 
international minimum standards outlined in the preceding sections could counter 
such tendencies. Additionally, the benefits that the country would receive from 
users outside such country could convince governments against setting up an 
unfair system. 
 126 For patentable subject matter, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 127 Id. § 271. 
 128 Id. § 112. 
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who make, use, or sell inventions covered under a claim would thus 
be infringing upon the patent right.129 A similar claims-based right, 
but one that reflects the unique features of TMK and the 
bioprospecting process, could be set up for the proposed right. 
If the proposed system is to reach its full potential, a core 
difference that cannot be avoided is the differing levels of interest in 
making the documented TMK either publicly accessible or 
restricted. Below, two types of TMK databases and the rights that 
may arise from them are analyzed. 
a. Two Types of Databases 
The scope of a bioprospecting right would depend on the type of 
disclosure (i.e., the type of TMK database). There would be two 
types of databases: (1) a publicly accessible database and (2) a 
restricted database. TMK in a restricted database will only be 
accessible to the source community and the relevant agency with 
which the TMK is registered. The reason for creating two types of 
databases relates to the need to encompass communities with 
differing interests with regard to the accessibility of their 
knowledge. 
The ideal scenario in terms of encouraging innovation may be 
the disclosure of TMK in a publicly accessible database. The public 
accessibility of the database will inform users in the industry about 
the existence of the knowledge whom will then create spillover 
effects that spur innovation. For instance, the accessibility of the 
TMK database could reveal an important piece of information to 
researchers in a seemingly unrelated field. 
However, some knowledge-holder communities and their 
licensees may be opposed to the public disclosure of their TMK. 
Communities may seek to keep their TMK secret because disclosure 
or commercialization is against their worldview. Other communities 
might be opposed to public disclosure because they want to 
commercialize their TMK while keeping it a secret. In both cases, 
there is an efficiency argument for encouraging these actors to invest 
in the documentation of a disappearing body of knowledge. If the 
proposed protection was made conditional on the actors publicly 
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disclosing their TMK, it might result in excluding these two groups. 
A system which encourages the documentation of TMK in a 
restricted database should be preferred over one that simply allows 
bodies of knowledge to disappear. 
The discussion of restricted TMK databases hints at the 
possibility of protecting the knowledge through laws that govern 
trade secrets. Scholars have proposed the protection of TMK 
through trade secret laws,130 which do not have many rigid 
requirements. Information which is not publicly accessible and 
provides its holder with a competitive advantage in its business 
could be protected under this regime so long as the owner takes 
reasonable measures to keep the knowledge from falling into the 
hands of unauthorized persons.131 The absence of sophisticated 
requirements for protection makes trade secret regimes the apparent 
candidate for TMK protection. However, the core problem 
identified in this article—the alarming rate of TMK loss—would not 
be sufficiently addressed through such regimes because trade secret 
regimes are not designed to encourage the documentation of secret 
knowledge. 
In order to respond to the unique features of TMK, trade secret 
regimes could be modified to encourage TMK documentation. This 
is where the protection of restricted TMK databases becomes 
important. The protection of bioprospecting rights in restricted 
TMK databases is similar to trade secret protection in that it does 
not require the public disclosure of information. However, the active 
encouragement of TMK documentation would be an inherent part 
of such a system. 
The protection of restricted TMK databases would encourage 
two groups of communities that are interested in using the legal 
framework. It would allow communities interested in 
commercializing their TMK while preferring to keep it secret to 
codify their TK in restricted databases. The framework provides 
them with the necessary legal rights on which to base their 
                                               
 130 See Long, supra note 64; Varadarajan, supra note 96. 
 131 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.4 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 1985), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets 
/utsa_final_85.pdf. 
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negotiation. It will also encourage communities not interested in 
commercializing TMK at all to invest in documenting their TMK to 
prevent its loss. These types of databases could be used as a 
repository of TMK and as evidence of its existence and ownership. 
In order to facilitate the licensing of TMK in both public and 
restricted databases, the database could include information on the 
ways in which users could obtain a license from the knowledge-
holder community or their representative. The information could 
include the name and contact address, any rules and practices that 
must be followed to receive a license, etc. In restricted databases, 
TMK would not be fully disclosed, but a general statement could be 
included to guide potential users in their licensing initiatives. This 
feature of TMK databases could save significant transaction costs 
for the bioprospecting industry. 
b. Two Types of Rights 
The two types of TMK databases discussed above should give 
rise to two sets of rights that are consistent with the features of the 
database. 
There are two alternative frameworks for granting the right over 
TMK disclosed in a publicly available database. The first grants 
source communities an exclusive right to undertake bioprospecting 
based on the publicly disclosed TMK. The right would include the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell products and services that 
result from the bioprospecting project based on the documented 
TMK. Since most knowledge-holder communities may not have the 
resources required to commercialize their knowledge, it can be 
anticipated that they will license these rights either in whole or in 
part. Interested users could license this right from the right holders, 
and the particularities of the license would be left to the parties to 
decide. Because of the unpredictable nature of bioprospecting, this 
framework could be expected to establish a royalty-based system in 
which users would share profits with right holders only if they have 
been successful in producing a product based on the particular 
TMK. An upfront lump sum payment combined with royalty 
payment could also be used. 
If such a framework is adopted, there is a risk that the source 
community would have an incentive to over claim the value of TMK 
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by listing a long list of conditions that the TMK covers without 
necessarily having used the TMK for such conditions. Since right 
holders would have the power to grant or refuse consent for 
bioprospecting over the TMK, they can use this powerful right and 
over claim the value of TMK. If parties to a license establish a 
royalty-based system in which fees are paid only if there is a 
successful product, the incentive to over claim will be reduced. 
However, right holders could insist on up-front lump sum payments 
instead of a royalty-based fee system, and therefore still have an 
incentive to over claim. The uncertainty related to measurements of 
licensee fees could increase the transaction costs involved. The 
system would benefit both knowledge-holding communities and 
firms if this risk could be mitigated. 
In patent laws of several jurisdictions, there are doctrines 
designed to reduce the incentive to over claim.132 A key doctrine in 
this regard is the requirement that inventions have “utility.” Patent 
applicants are required to establish the utility or usefulness of an 
invention either through demonstration or through “sound 
prediction.”133 To benefit from the doctrine of sound prediction, 
patent applicants have to show, through a combination of factual 
statements and sound line of reasoning, that the claimed invention 
could be expected to do what the patent claims.134 Additionally, 
patent specifications are required to disclose enough information to 
allow a Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art (PHOSITA), who 
follows the instructions, to produce the claimed invention.135 While 
these requirements may reduce the incentive to over claim in patent 
applications, it is challenging to adopt similar requirements for the 
bioprospecting regime proposed in this article. This is because 
source communities may not be able to explain their TMK in 
scientific terms to meet the standards of sound prediction. 
Additionally, requiring that TMK codification include explanations 
on how it addresses certain conditions can be expected to increase 
the cost of codification, which in turn may reduce the incentive to 
codify TMK. Therefore, the feasible alternative for users is to create 
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a royalty-based agreement in which benefits are shared only where 
the substantial reliance in the disclosed TMK results in a successful 
drug. 
The second alternative framework is to grant source 
communities a right to benefit from successful bioprospecting 
projects based on TMK disclosed in a publicly accessible database. 
In this framework, users would be allowed to start bioprospecting 
without having to obtain consent from the source community. If and 
when a successful product is produced, using the publicly disclosed 
TMK, rights holders would have the claim to an appropriate share 
of the profits. The exact share of the profits could be calculated by 
a court, a tribunal, or an agency based on an estimated contribution 
that the TMK made to the final product. Jerome Reichman has 
proposed a similar “liability rules” framework in which users are 
allowed to use available knowledge and are only required to share 
benefits once a successful product is produced.136 
There is a risk of over-claiming within this framework as well. 
However, because of the reduced power of the right, source 
communities will have a highly limited incentive to over-claim. 
Source communities can claim their right to a share of the profits 
only if there is a successful product produced through a substantial 
reliance on the publicly disclosed TMK. Because there is limited 
chance that TMK, which has never been used to treat a condition, 
could prove to be useful in treating that same condition, there is little 
incentive to over claim. Even if source communities over-claim, 
they have to overcome the challenging burden of proving that users 
relied substantially on the over-claimed TMK to produce the 
product from which profits are to be shared. 
The first framework—granting source communities an 
exclusive right to conduct bioprospecting—has two key advantages 
when compared to the right to share benefits. First, it gives the right 
holder a veto power over bioprospecting and thus forces users to 
seek a license in advance. This will, in turn, make the process of 
                                               
 136 Reichman, supra note 95; Reichman & Lewis, supra note 31. Section VI of 
this paper on “Building Stakeholder Buy-in” outlines steps that should be taken 
to safeguard against abuse of the system by users and enabling source 
communities to build trust in the system. See infra Section VI. 
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enforcing the right much easier compared to a framework that 
adopts the right to share benefits. In the latter case, since users can 
use TMK in the publicly available database without the consent of 
source communities, it may be challenging to identify and locate 
users to ensure fair compensation. Anyone can access the publicly 
available database, use it to produce a product, and claim to have 
not relied on the TMK. To mitigate this problem, a presumption 
could be put in place in which any user who begins conducting 
research related to a TMK after the publication of the TMK in a 
publicly accessible database would be presumed to have had access 
to such TMK. Users will have the burden of proving that they started 
to conduct research before the TMK publication and/or that they did 
not substantially rely on the disclosed TMK in producing the 
product. Second, the exclusive right can be licensed on an exclusive 
basis, and therefore potential exclusive licensees who could earn 
monopoly rents downstream would share them with right holders. 
The prospect of earning higher profits from exclusive licenses could 
be expected to encourage more investment in TMK codification. 
Despite these major advantages, the exclusive right to conduct 
bioprospecting involves the risk of over-claiming discussed above. 
Furthermore, such framework may lock down wide areas of research 
by giving an exclusive right to conduct research in such an area to 
one entity. The second framework, in which source communities 
have a right to share benefits, enables competition among 
researchers in a particular field. It can also be expected to reduce the 
transaction costs involved in locating and requesting a license from 
source communities, which may be attractive for users. The absence 
of this requirement may facilitate innovative activity based on the 
TMK, as Reichman has argued.137 Although both frameworks have 
advantages and disadvantages and policy makers could choose a 
suitable framework, the second framework in which source 
communities have a right to share the profits of a successful 
bioprospecting process is preferred. This will greatly reduce the 
incentive to over claim and can be expected to facilitate investment 
and innovation in bioprospecting projects. The reduction of 
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transaction costs should also facilitate bioprospecting partnerships 
between users and source communities. 
With regard to TMK codified in a restricted database, source 
communities would have the exclusive right to license the TMK and 
a right to obtain compensation from users who access the TMK 
through unauthorized means.138 Once the source community (or its 
representative) registers the TMK in a restricted database, individual 
members of the community will be barred from communicating the 
registered TMK without the consent of the community elders. Users 
who induce a member to disclose the information or who violate the 
rules of obtaining access would be liable for unauthorized access. 
Information relating to the rules and principles that should be 
followed to receive a license from the community, as decided by the 
appropriate community representative, should be documented 
together with the TMK. 
The various remedies at the disposal of courts could be used to 
respond further to the particulars of infringement cases that may 
arise from the proposed bioprospecting right. As the Supreme Court 
of Canada held in Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.,139 the 
primary objective of calculating the proper mode of compensation 
in breach of confidential information cases is to arrive at an 
equitable result given the facts of the case, rather than a specific 
amount of compensation.140 The court declared that because of the 
way the common law has developed in the area, the suitable remedy 
for a particular case could emanate from equity, contracts, torts, or 
property.141 These remedies may include accounting for profits, 
potential royalty fees that would have been paid, lost opportunity, 
head-start (spring-board) compensations, and even injunctive relief 
in the limited cases in which other remedies may not result in a fair 
outcome. For instance, since most knowledge-holder communities 
                                               
 138 The right to obtain compensation could be facultative. If a malicious intent 
is discovered in accessing TK, the amount of compensation could accordingly be 
higher. This would be decided by the court, tribunal, or government agency that 
would deal with compensation. 
 139 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 (Can.), 
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may not themselves be engaged in bioprospecting initiatives, there 
may not be sufficient evidence for damages calculated as lost 
profits. In these cases, adopting the head-start or spring-board 
principle adopted in the Schweppes case may be beneficial. If courts 
adopt this principle, the damage will be the value of the head-start 
benefit the defendant received (i.e., the amount of financial expense 
the defendant saved by accessing the TMK unlawfully).142 
The above section outlines what the breadth of the 
bioprospecting right may be in theory. The following section 
examines a practical case that adopts a similar framework. The 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has developed a 
robust classification of TK which speaks to the different levels of 
diffusion entailed in TK and the different potential rights that may 
be available.143 Depending on the particular policy objective, the 
adoption of a mixture of the proposed framework with the 
classifications outlined by the WIPO may be beneficial. 
c. WIPO’s Draft Framework 
The WIPO has grouped the potential status in which TK may be 
found and the possible alternative rights that knowledge holders 
might be interested in (table reproduced below).144 Such mechanism 
could be modified for use in the bioprospecting rights outlined in 
this article to meet the needs of the jurisdiction that is considering 
adopting the mechanism. 
In the ‘nature of TK’ row, the tool categorizes TK progressively 
from the least publicly available to the most publicly available. The 
categorization lists secret knowledge, closely held knowledge, 
publicly available knowledge, and widely diffused knowledge. With 
respect to the possible rights that knowledge holders might receive, 
the tool provides a menu of rights which includes exclusive property 
rights, moral rights,145 protection against unfair competition, and 
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 143 WEND WENDLAND, WORK IN THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 
- INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND GENETIC 
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/tk/933/wipo_pub_933.pdf. 
 144  Id.  
 145 Moral rights refer to the non-economic right that an author of a copyrighted 
work has over the work. These rights include the right of attribution, the right to 
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compensation or benefit sharing. At times, the nature of the 
knowledge might determine the best right. For example, an 
exclusive property right for widely diffused knowledge might be 
unworkable. Similarly, compensation or benefit sharing might not 
be an alternative for spiritually or culturally important knowledge 
that communities are not interested in commercializing. While 
WIPO’s draft framework outlines the different scenarios, it does not 












     
Exclusive 
property rights 
     
Moral rights       
Unfair 
competition 
     
Compensation/ 
benefit sharing  
     
Table 1: WIPO’s Draft Framework for TK Protection146 
2. Term of Bioprospecting Right 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the second factor 
affecting the scope of a right is the length. The terms of 
bioprospecting rights should depend on the type of TK database. In 
the case of TK documented in a restricted database, protection 
should last as long as the conditions for protection continue to exist. 
As long as the TK remains secret and the TK-holder community 
does not document it in a publicly accessible database, there should 
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be a bioprospecting right in such TK. If the TK-holder community 
decides to move TK from a restricted database to a publicly 
accessible one, then the calculation of term limits should begin from 
such time. In cases where TK-holder communities disclose the TK 
before it is included in the restricted databases or it discloses without 
confidentiality restrictions, the source community should still have 
rights in the restricted TK so long as the core requirements of the 
proposed bioprospecting right are met. 
One implicit requirement is that protection of TK documented 
in a restricted database would only last as long as the source 
community. If the TK-holder community disappears, then TK 
documented in a restricted database should be made freely 
accessible. In order to determine when a TK holding community has 
ceased to exist, the database could require the registration of a 
contact person or representative of the source community. In cases 
where no community representative claims rights to the documented 
TK within a reasonable amount of time, rights in the documentation 
could cease to exist. 
With regard to TK documented in a publicly accessible database, 
there should be some sort of term limit that begins from the time the 
knowledge is officially documented in the database. Although some 
stakeholders call for perpetual rights over TMK,147 economic 
efficiency would call for the term of the proposed right to be limited 
to a term that would encourage the optimal codification and 
disclosure of TMK. Since the effect of a legal intervention to 
encourage codification can only exist as long as knowledge-holder 
communities continue to exist, efficiency requires that the exclusive 
right should, at a maximum, lapse when the knowledge-holder 
community disappears. However, the exact term can only be 
determined after considerable theoretical and empirical research 
into the range of incentives needed to encourage optimal 
codification of TK. Until a jurisdiction is able to ascertain the 
optimal term for a bioprospecting right, it should provide such right 
on an experimental basis based on general references to the diverse 
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terms of conventional and unconventional IP rights. It may be 
argued that in such situations there is a risk that a source jurisdiction 
might have a lengthy or perpetual bioprospecting right. However, 
since adopting a perpetual or lengthy bioprospecting right would 
discourage users from engaging with such jurisdiction, countries 
might have an incentive to avoid highly restrictive systems. 
The core question policy makers should take into consideration 
is the effect that a term might have in encouraging TMK codification 
and disclosure. If a term is too short, it may fail to encourage 
knowledge-holder communities to codify their TMK. If the term is 
too long, it may discourage users (who would have to pay royalty 
fees for the duration of the term of the right) from using TMK in 
bioprospecting projects. The appropriate term for TMK should be 
one that strikes a balance between these extremes. It is reasonable 
to presume that the longer the term of protection the stronger the 
effect of the right in encouraging TMK codification and 
disclosure.148 However, the incremental effect of an additional year 
of protection will diminish as the term increases. 
The purpose of establishing the bioprospecting right is to 
encourage the codification and disclosure of TMK. However, as it 
has been noted throughout this article, knowledge-holder 
communities are widely divergent in background and interests. As a 
result, the amount of protection that would encourage one 
community to codify and disclose its knowledge might not have the 
same effect on another community. Thus, a set of alternative 
frameworks that give stakeholders some flexibility would be 
suitable. 
It is also worth reiterating that the term of the right is only one 
factor in the overall scheme of encouraging TMK codification and 
disclosure. The breadth of the right and other features of the 
domestic legal system are essential to the incentive analysis. A 
framework for TMK protection should take into consideration the 
cumulative effect of these diverse features in encouraging 
documentation and disclosure. 
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Although most economists recommend term limits for 
intellectual property rights,149 there is little evidence to indicate the 
optimal term for intellectual property rights in general.150 In most 
countries, standard patent terms are for 20 years from the date of the 
application for a patent.151 In countries recognizing utility models 
(otherwise known as petty patents), there are diverse but smaller 
terms (usually 7–10 years) that are adopted for small 
improvements.152 This implies that the optimal term for patent 
protection depends on the subject matter of protection.153 Therefore, 
it may be worthwhile to investigate the efficiencies involved in 
differing terms for different TMK contributions to bioprospecting.154 
In analyzing different terms of protection, policy makers should 
consider the administrative costs involved. To make an analogy with 
patents, the optimal system would be one that assesses the life of a 
patent on a case-by-case basis; however, the administrative costs 
would make such a system inefficient.155 Similarly, a case-by-case 
analysis of optimal protection for TMK may be inefficient. 
a. Factors Necessary for Setting the Term of Protection 
Even if the goal of setting the optimal term of the proposed right 
is elusive, there are some factors that should be considered when 
determining the duration of a term. Therefore, instead of picking a 
specific term for TMK, this section discusses the core factors that 
should be considered in selecting such a term. 
One core factor to consider is the incentivizing effect that patent 
law has had on the codification and disclosure of modern 
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 154 Reichman & Lewis, supra note 31, at 354. 
 155 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 150, at 132. 
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inventions.156 Reichman and Lewis suggest that the term “should be 
longer than we envision for present-day sub-patentable innovation” 
because of the unique equity goals that are present in the use of the 
knowledge of indigenous and local communities and “of the 
typically slow accretion” of such knowledge.157 By “sub-patentable 
innovation” Reichman and Lewis are referring to improvements on 
existing knowledge that are not advanced enough to receive patent 
protection.158 Both the equity and accretion rate rationales seem to 
have some force, and both have implications for the incentive to 
codify and disclose.159 Communities that have been oppressed for 
generations might require a stronger right in order to undo centuries 
of mistrust. The limited value that TMK has on its own also points 
to the need for a longer term if the right is to be sufficient to 
encourage the documentation and disclosure of TMK.160 
Although Reichman and Lewis do mention the term of twenty 
years in the hypothetical they use, they avoid suggesting what the 
term should be.161 In most countries, present-day sub-patentable 
innovations162 such as petty patents or utility models receive 
protection for seven to ten years.163 Article 38 of the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) allows member countries 
to provide protection for up to fifteen years for “layout designs 
(topographies) of integrated circuits.”164 Because of the low 
standalone value of TMK, it seems that the term of protection should 
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indeed be longer than other sub-patentable innovations that have a 
readily available commercial value. 
Another factor that should be considered in deciding what term 
limits to adopt is the average time it takes to produce a successful 
drug using TMK. The proposed term of protection should be longer 
than the average bioprospecting time to allow communities and their 
licensees who invest in the documentation and disclosure of TMK 
to reap sufficient benefits. Those who invest in the codification and 
disclosure will likely only receive a limited portion of the profits 
that would accrue from a successful drug development process. This 
is because the TMK contribution is usually going to occur in the 
early stages of development and more research and development 
investments would be required to produce a successful drug. 
Therefore, in order for this limited share of the profits to be 
sufficient to encourage communities to codify and disclose their 
knowledge, the right would have to cover at least the average time 
the bioprospecting process takes. 
The average length of the drug discovery process has been 
estimated to be twelve to fifteen years.165 This is a general estimate 
that does not take into consideration the use of TMK in this process. 
Therefore, the use of TMK might reduce this timeline significantly. 
However, it is not easy to estimate by how much this timeline would 
be reduced. More research is required to show what the duration of 
average drug discovery would be when TMK is used. Despite the 
uncertainty related to the average time the process may take, the 
currently available twelve- to fifteen-year estimate could be used as 
a reference point. It should be noted, however, that the expiration of 
patent rights before investments in drug discovery are often 
recouped is seen as a major problem in the biopharmaceutical 
industry.166 Therefore, researchers would have to consider a similar 
risk in cases of bioprospecting projects when setting term limits. 
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A third analogy that could be used in setting terms for the 
proposed bioprospecting right is the term used for data and 
marketing exclusivity. Data exclusivity refers to the protection 
extended to pre-clinical and clinical test data used in the drug 
approval process from use by other firms applying for regulatory 
approval.167 An additional exclusive right, market exclusivity, refers 
to the exclusive right given to original manufacturers to market a 
drug before competing generic versions are allowed to be 
marketed.168 Both exclusive rights could work independently or 
alongside patent rights, which means at its maximum the collective 
exclusive right could be set at twenty years plus the period of data 
and market exclusivity. 
Data and marketing exclusivity terms differ depending on the 
subject matter and the jurisdiction. For instance, the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) provides seven years of exclusivity to 
Orphan Drugs (ODE) and five years for New Chemicals (NCE).169 
In the European Union, the term has been harmonized (for 
applications filed after November 2005) to eight years of data 
exclusivity, plus a two-year general marketing exclusivity, and an 
additional one year of marketing exclusivity if the medical product 
has a “new indication.”170 Therefore, the term of exclusivity in the 
EU can extend to eleven years from the initial marketing approval 
by the original applicant.171 In Canada, the term is between six to 
eight years depending on specific factors.172 Up to thirty-one years 
of exclusivity can be acquired as the maximum term resulting from 
the combination of twenty years of patent rights with up to eleven 
                                               
 167 Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International 
Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. 
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years of exclusivity (at least in the EU).173 In addition to these 
general terms of exclusivity, there are also particular exceptions for 
which shorter or longer terms of exclusivity are applied. 
This brief survey of data and market exclusivity shows that what 
policymakers believe to be optimal depends highly on the 
jurisdiction and the subject matter involved. Although these terms 
are related to bioprospecting because they deal with the drug 
discovery process, data and market exclusivity become relevant in 
later stages of the drug development process, whereas 
bioprospecting happens in the early stages. Thus, the terms of 
protections being provided for data and market exclusivity may not 
be justified in the case of TMK used in bioprospecting. Furthermore, 
the terms of data and market exclusivity may highly depend on the 
lobbying power of special interest groups that successfully lobby 
governments, which make existing terms less useful as a reference. 
Despite these considerable shortcomings, these terms still provide 
important reference points in the absence of data relating to the 
average time that bioprospecting projects take to the point of 
marketing a TK-based product or service. 
While the above analysis points to a limited term of protection 
for the proposed bioprospecting right, it is appropriate to engage 
with the proposal for perpetual rights in TMK that some 
stakeholders advance.174 
b. Perpetual Bioprospecting Right? 
Indigenous and local communities are heterogeneous and 
therefore have different worldviews from each other. Some 
communities may not recognize the concept of term limits on their 
knowledge.175 This seems even more plausible given the fact that 
TMK is usually considered to be an inherent part of the cultural and 
environmental aspects of the community—it is even considered to 
be part of the cultural identity of some communities. Therefore, the 
idea of losing control over the knowledge following the expiration 
                                               
 173 Parliament and Council Directive on Medicinal Products for Human Use, 
supra note 170. 
 174 RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 147, at 399. 
 175 Many developing countries and the African Group call for perpetual rights 
over TK. See id. 
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of a set term may be alien, and unattractive, to some.176 However, 
losing control does not mean losing the ability to continue to use and 
apply their knowledge; it only means that communities will not be 
able to regulate the use of their knowledge by others. Even in this 
sense, some communities still may not be enthusiastic in codifying 
and disclosing their knowledge to outsiders who might use such 
knowledge in ways that offend the community. 
Proposals for perpetual intellectual property rights over know-
how are very rare. There does not seem to be any Western 
jurisdiction with a perpetual patent system. Terms differ from one 
community to another, but every jurisdiction seems to have term 
limits. The U.S. Constitution goes to the extent of expressly calling 
for term limits on such rights.177 The U.S. Constitution gives 
Congress the power to enact legislation to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”178 It seems clear from such statements that term limits 
are inherent in the American concept of patents. Other intellectual 
property rights such as trademarks and the protection of secret 
information do not have specified term limits.179 Such a right could 
be considered perpetual so long as certain conditions continue to be 
fulfilled. 
For example, there have been calls for perpetual copyright.180 
However, such proposals have been strongly criticized for 
misunderstanding the nature of intellectual property rights.181 The 
case for perpetual intellectual property rights is hard to make, 
particularly in the case of patent rights. The scope of patents is 
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generally broader than that of copyrights and thus, making a case for 
perpetual claims to broad rights is unpersuasive. 
As defined in this thesis, TMK is know-how and, as such, 
resembles subject matter protected under patent laws. Because of 
the above-described difference between the world views of 
indigenous and local communities on the one hand and Western 
perspectives on the other, a tension might arise when jurisdictions 
set up the proposed bioprospecting rights regime. It will be a 
challenge to show an economic efficiency rationale for a perpetual 
bioprospecting right because presenting moral rights as analogous 
to a right which at its core is an economic right would be flawed 
reasoning. The analysis, instead, would benefit more from analogies 
with other intellectual property concepts. 
c. Analogy to Database Protection 
It is plausible to provide renewed protection for new entries into 
TMK databases. Such a system is all the more important given the 
need to establish dynamic databases to reflect the dynamic nature of 
TMK. One key precedent that knowledge-holder communities can 
turn to is database protection. Separate protection for databases—or 
a database right—is uncommon. Yet, making comparisons between 
such systems and the proposed bioprospecting right may be fruitful 
since TMK codification and disclosure would, in effect, mean the 
establishment of a TMK database. 
The European Union database directive is one of the more 
popular systems of database protection.182 The core purpose of the 
EU database directive is economic efficiency.183 It is intended to 
correct the market failure that results from the non-excludable 
nature of information goods documented in databases.184 Article 10 
of the directive sets fifteen years as the term limit for the protection 
of databases.185 The directive goes further to state the following: 
                                               
 182 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. L. 77/20, http://eur-
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Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the 
contents of a database, including any substantial change resulting from 
the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which 
would result in the database being considered to be a substantial new 
investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify the 
database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection.186  
Adding substantially new content to a database gives rise to a 
new term of fifteen years for such databases.187 Therefore, a dynamic 
database would provide continued protection for substantially 
altered content. It is possible to apply such a practice to the proposed 
sui generis TMK system. In these cases, continued protection for 
dynamic TMK databases would be allowed so long as the 
information is substantially altered.188 However, such an analogy 
will only support continued protection for TMK databases to a 
limited extent. Some TMK might not change significantly in such a 
short period of time, and thus, it might not be considered 
“substantially new.” Additionally, the protection of TMK should be 
for the benefit of those who provide the information rather than for 
the benefit of those who own or run the database. Consequently, the 
benefits of comparing TMK databases to existing database 
protection should be complemented by features that address the 
differences between the two subject matters. 
d. Analogy to “Domaine Public Payant” 
The issue of “domaine public payant” or “a paying public 
domain” is yet another existing system that scholars have 
discussed.189 It bears some resemblance to the interest of some 
knowledge holders for perpetual rights. The domaine public payant, 
which mostly relates to copyright law, is a system in which users 
pay for works that have already fallen into the public domain.190 In 
1980, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) conducted a survey of its member states 
asking if they had a system resembling the domaine public payant 
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in their jurisdictions and forty-six members responded.191 Of the 
forty-six countries that responded, a minority (twelve countries) 
confirmed that they had systems that resembled a paying public 
domain.192 This obligation to pay for public domain material is a 
perpetual obligation in almost all of these jurisdictions193 and takes 
the form of a small percentage of the selling price of the product.194 
It should be noted, however, that some jurisdictions have a short list 
of the types of works covered under such system.195 The royalties 
collected through such a system are either paid directly to 
associations of authors of works or to the state which, in turn, 
forwards at least some of the payment to such associations.196 The 
application of a paying public domain to traditional knowledge197 
that has already fallen into the public domain is supported by some 
scholars and has already been adopted by some developing 
countries.198 
However, setting up a perpetual right for compensation from 
know-how raises complex efficiency concerns. The move from 
protecting expressions perpetually to protecting know-how 
perpetually has its challenges. First, even if the precedent of a 
perpetual “right” to compensation exists, it is known only in a 
handful of jurisdictions,199 and the right relates only to 
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expressions.200 Secondly, rights over expression (such as copyrights) 
are relatively shallow because there are alternative ways of 
expressing the same idea. Patent rights are broad because acts of 
infringement do not have to be exact imitations.201 Indeed, in the US 
the doctrine of equivalents allows courts to decide that an act 
substantially similar to the patented invention infringes if it does 
“substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to 
yield substantially the same result.”202 Acts that are substantially 
similar to those stated in the patent claim would be considered 
infringements. Inventors who develop an invention independently 
(without accessing a patented invention) and those who reverse 
engineer products embodying an invention are still excluded from 
receiving patent rights over the invention.203 The subject matter of 
protection discussed in this article resembles those protected under 
patent rights, not copyrights. Even if there is a precedent for granting 
perpetual rights over expressions, extending such right to know-how 
is quite different. Additionally, even if the lengthier term of 
copyright protection (life plus 50 or 70 generally and 95–120 for 
works for hire)204 exists, proposing such a term for the 
bioprospecting right is unjustified because of the difference between 
the two rights discussed above. 
There is little literature that shows the efficiencies of adopting a 
perpetual economic right over know-how.205 The risk of establishing 
an inefficient system is even more pronounced when the right 
granted is substantively broad. The broader the right, the shorter the 
term should be. Given the fact that the right outlined in this section 
is a substantive one, it should not be a perpetual right. 
                                               
 200 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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One way to respond to this complex question in the context of 
the bioprospecting right proposed earlier is to set up an inverse 
relationship between the length and the breadth of the 
bioprospecting right. The broader the right, the shorter its term 
would be, and the narrower the right, the longer it would be. If such 
a system is adopted, perpetual rights would be left only to the 
narrowest bioprospecting rights. One may argue that perpetual 
rights should only apply to “moral rights” in TMK, such as the right 
to receive attribution. The longest any substantive right should last 
is for the period the knowledge-holder community continues to 
exist. A perpetual bioprospecting right over TMK is unwarranted in 
the economic terms discussed in this article. The dynamic efficiency 
gains would not be more than the static inefficiency gains if the right 
is a perpetual right because the static inefficiency will continue to 
increase while the dynamic efficiency gains will decrease over time. 
e. Concluding Remarks on Term of Right 
Economic literature would suggest that the longer the term of 
bioprospecting right, the more codification and disclosure is 
encouraged, but the more follow-on innovation is discouraged.206 
However, this general principle is limited by the fact that after a 
certain length, the incentivizing power of protection disappears 
while the social cost of restricting access continues to increase.207 
There is little agreement on what the optimal term of exclusive rights 
over information goods should be. The right term would balance the 
two interests in static and dynamic efficiency.208 Even if there were 
no dynamic costs (i.e., negative effects on follow-on innovation), 
the static costs, such as higher prices, might be greater than the 
benefit if the right is perpetual. 
It seems reasonable to provide protection that is longer than that 
given to sub-patentable protection (i.e., seven to ten years), given 
the limited standalone value and slow accretion rates for TMK. It 
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also seems justifiable to provide protection for as long as the average 
bioprospecting process takes. Although the average drug discovery 
timeline with the use of TMK may be hard to estimate, the 
aforementioned twelve- to fifteen-year estimated timeline for 
general drug discovery could be used as a reference point. 
Additionally, the diverse terms of protection provided for data and 
market exclusivity should be factored in. In such analysis, it should 
be noted that these terms of exclusivity may work independently of 
or in conjunction with the exclusivity provided by patent rights. The 
general terms of data and market exclusion range from three to ten 
years.209 
In terms of the range within which policymakers could fix term 
limits, a minimal protection of twelve to fifteen years could be 
adopted using the average time it takes to develop a drug. At a 
maximum, any bioprospecting right adopted under such a system 
should be tied to the continued existence of the knowledge-
providing community. As one scholar noted, “the duration of 
protection [should be] linked to the subsistence of the conditions for 
protection.”210 The proposals for perpetual bioprospecting rights 
over TMK may not be justified when seen through an economic 
efficiency lens. It may be justifiable to provide renewed terms of 
protection for significantly new additions to the TMK database, as 
is done in some existing database protection regimes. The scope of 
protection under copyright is shallow compared to the proposed 
bioprospecting right. Thus, it is not reasonable to compare the two 
terms. 
Because of the challenges in determining optimal terms, further 
theoretical and empirical research into, among other things, the 
average time it takes to produce TK-based products through 
bioprospecting projects should be conducted in order to make an 
informed decision. The core question in such inquiry should focus 
on the implications of the different terms of protection in 
encouraging the codification and disclosure of TMK, on the one 
hand, and for follow-on innovation on the other. 
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The term of the proposed bioprospecting right works in tandem 
with other features of the system and its environment. Therefore, the 
implications of the term of protection should be considered in the 
larger context under which it operates. Perhaps different features, 
such as the scope of the right and its value to society, could be 
considered when deciding what term to adopt. 
IV. NATURE AND SCOPE OF CODIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE 
Critics often focus on the nature and scope of TMK 
codification.211 Some commentators argue that codification would 
remove the knowledge from its environmental and cultural context, 
thereby disrupting its original setting.212 However, such criticism 
misses the fact that it is possible to provide cultural and 
environmental context while codifying TMK. This criticism also 
disregards the fact that knowledge can be codified without limiting 
the ability of knowledge holding communities to continue using 
their TMK in accordance with tradition. Because TMK faces an 
alarming rate of loss, imperfect codification is preferred over 
oblivion. In this spirit, the following section discusses the scope of 
TMK codification. 
A. Holistic Codification 
Although the nature and scope of TMK codification could vary 
according to the capacity and culture of knowledge-holder 
communities, preferably codification should be holistic. An attempt 
should be made to include cultural, environmental, and geographic 
aspects of TMK when codifying the body of knowledge. In addition 
to alleviating the concerns of critics of codification, such a holistic 
approach may increase the value of the codification in other ways. 
First, the cultural and environmental context in which TMK is found 
may offer some valuable lessons for subsequent users. Since 
bioprospecting involves significant unknown elements, the more 
holistic a TMK codification is, the greater the chance that users will 
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be able to develop successful drugs. Second, in addition to the value 
of TMK codification for modern medicine, the codification might 
have significant anthropological and historical value. 
An important element in making TMK codification holistic is 
the use of multi-disciplinary teams in the codification process. Such 
teams should be made up of not only biomedical professionals but 
also anthropologists, historians, archivists, and other social 
scientists. Through such a system, knowledge codification could 
have the supplementary value of preserving the culture and 
environment through text. In addition to multi-disciplinary teams, 
cutting-edge technological developments could be applied 
whenever possible. For instance, audio-visual equipment could be 
used to document not only the knowledge but also the setting in 
which TMK is used. This could include having body cameras or 
other recording devices on traditional healers or their assistants to 
document the way they pick their resources, the way they deliver 
treatments, etc. A concern that may arise here is that, in some 
cultures, it may be offensive to use certain technologies. In such 
situations, respect should be given to the customary rules and 
practices so as not to alienate knowledge-holder communities. 
It should, however, be noted that holistic codification does have 
limitations. For instance, use of multi-disciplinary teams and 
technology may increase the cost of documentation. In some cases, 
this increased cost could be offset by the increased value (both 
monetary and non-monetary) of holistic codification. However, 
codification of the available resources and at whatever level of detail 
is still more valuable than letting the knowledge disappear. Thus, 
codification should be encouraged even if some communities or 
countries may not succeed in making holistic codification. Since 
TMK faces an alarming rate of loss, documenting as much 
knowledge as possible as quickly as possible should be the goal. 
Once codified, certain knowledge could be updated using dynamic 
knowledge codification systems. 
B. Scope of Codification 
As a general principle, the preferred system of codification is a 
broad one rather than narrow. While narrow TMK codification 
would provide basic information, such as the name of the resource 
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and its use, broad TMK codification would add details such as where 
the plant resource is located, what time of the year it grows, and 
what exact steps are used to extract the resources. It would also 
include supporting documents collected or created by a multi-
disciplinary team made up of traditional healers, elders, 
anthropologists, scientists, technology experts, etc. Technologies 
related to knowledge codification, categorizations, geographical 
location, and the like would be used to make the codification more 
accessible, holistic, and dynamic. The broader the scope, the more 
valuable the knowledge. 
Here, it is instructive to revisit the hypothetical case of the Fan 
people and their Goodya plant to explain what the different levels of 
codification can look like. A narrow codification of the TMK related 
to the Goodya plant would document the fact that the plant is used 
by traditional healers to help people with depression. It might also 
state the scientific name for Goodya, but that may be all the 
information that a narrow codification provides. 
On the other hand, a broad codification would attempt to codify 
as much information as possible given available resources. For 
instance, it could include the historical and cultural meaning Goodya 
has for the Fan people. It would specify the location in which 
Goodya grows, including GPS coordinates, the seasons in which it 
grows, and describe the ceremony in detail. In addition to Goodya’s 
traditional and scientific names, the system would include tags and 
classifications in which the resource falls under. When possible, it 
could detail the elements of the Goodya mixture. 
In addition to such information, a broad codification could have 
an audio-visual recording of the process of picking leaves and fruits 
of the Goodya tree and the full ritual including the chanting and the 
Hammer dance. The design of the clay pot, the face paintings, and 
the “garment of wise men” used in the ritual would also be recorded 
in detail. Broad codification should also include information on the 
customary rules of the Fan people related to their knowledge of the 
Goodya plant and their cultural expressions, such as the Hammer 
dance and the chants. In general, a broad system of codification 
should provide sufficient information to allow a user to not only 
investigate the resource but also understand the context in which it 
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is used. It should also make the knowledge accessible to both 
knowledge-holder communities and users. 
There are some TMK databases in different countries that could 
be used as a guide in setting up TMK codification systems. New 
databases can learn from existing databases and attempt to 
overcome their existing limitations such as their 
defensive/restrictive orientation, abiding by an international 
standard system classification. Perhaps the most famous TMK 
database is the Indian Traditional Knowledge Digital Library 
(TKDL).213 The next section discusses a real example from a TMK 
codification in the TKDL that was used in patent prosecution at the 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office. 
C. Example of Codified TMK: India’s TKDL 
India’s TKDL has managed to codify more than 150 books of 
Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha, and Yoga with close to three million 
transcriptions.214 Although the amount of information included in 
the database is impressive, it is currently only being used 
defensively to invalidate non-inventive patents.215 A more proactive 
use of the knowledge documented in the database would have 
considerable global welfare-maximizing potential. The accessibility 
of these three million transcripts to researchers can be expected to 
result in increased efficiency in research and development of 
biopharmaceutical products and services.216 
One sample of the information documented in the TKDL might 
help explain what a broad TMK codification should look like. The 
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TMK in question was used to challenge patent application number 
CA-02642184 for a “composition containing ginseng and 
cinnamon” by Goliath Oil and Gas Corporation.217 Dr. V.K. Gupta, 
the director of the TKDL, filed several transcriptions from the 
database under Section 34.1 of the Patent Act, and the submissions 
were used to challenge the patent.218 One of the key transcriptions is 
reproduced verbatim below to help with the discussion. 
Title of Traditional Knowledge Resource: Khamira Sandal Alvi 
Khani 
Knowledge Known Since: 100 Years 
TKRC CODE: AO1A-1/1331, AO1A-1/1347, AO1A-1/1654, 
AO1A-1/1720 [ . . . ] 
IPRC Code: A61K 133/00, A61K 35/64, A61K 36/185, A61K 
36/30 [ . . . ] 
DETAILS OF PROCESS/FORMULATION: 
1. Khamira Sandal Alvi Khani is a therapeutic single/compound 
formulation consisting of useful parts of following ingredients(s): 
Santalum album Linn. (sandalwood), Silk Coccon, Onosma 
bracteatum, Rosa damascene Mill. (pink rose, Rose), Nymphaea 
alba Linn. (European white water-lily, Water Lily), Cinnamomum 
zeylancicum Blume (cinnamon), Crocus sativus Linn. (saffron 
crocus, saffron), Granular sugar 
2. Therapeutic composition/formulation is mentioned below: 
1 santalum album Linn. (sandalwood)    
 -  9 gm 
2 Silk Cocoon        
 -  -shredded 9 mg 
3 Onosma bracteatum      
 Flower  12 gm 
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=(Composition+Containing+Ginseng+and+Cinnamon)&start=1&num=50&type
=advanced_search (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
 218 Id. 
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4 Rosa damascene Mill. (pink rose, Rose)   
 Flower  12 numbers 
5. Nymphaea alba Linn. (European white water-lilly, Water 
Lily)  Flower  24 gm 
6 Cinnamomum zeylanicum Blume (cinnamon)   
 Stem bark 2 gm 
7 Crocus sativus Linn. (saffron crocus, Saffron)  
 Stigma  2 gm 
8. Granular sugar      
 -   210 gm 
3. Therapeutic composition mentioned above is prepared as 
KHAMIRA: It is a semisolid preparation in which a decoction of 
certain drugs is prepared, [;] sugar is added to make a base 
(qiwam). Drugs of animal/mineral origin mentioned in the 
formulation are powdered and added at this time. It is then shaken 
vigorously with a DABI till [it] becomes white. In the end, 
silver/gold foil is added. 
4. A composition as described above is formulated as 
Honey/Sugar based Semisolid preparation. 
5. The dose of [the] above mentioned therapeutic composition is 
9 gm.219 
While the last communications on file show that the patent is in 
a “state of abandonment,”220 the official administrative status shows 
it is a “dead application.”221 
The TKDL seems to be somewhere in the spectrum halfway 
between narrow and broad codification of TMK. It describes the 
resources used and the knowledge of their use. However, the 
knowledge codified is very narrow because it does not provide much 
                                               
 219 Patent Document 2642184: Prosecution-Amendment Page, Exhibit 5, 
CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/cpd/ (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2017). 
 220 Patent 2667831 Summary, supra note 217. 
 221 Patent 2642184 Summary: Admin status, CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF., 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/opic-
cipo/cpd/eng/patent/2642184/summary.html?query=2642184+&start=1&num=5
0&type=basic_search (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
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information about the people from whom the knowledge originates. 
There are positive lessons that can be taken for use by TMK 
databases that will be organized in the future. There are also 
limitations that should be addressed. 
One of the major achievements of the TKDL is its creation of 
the Traditional Knowledge Resource Classification (TKRC). The 
TKRC, which imitated the International Patent Classification 
(IPC),222 was developed in response to the lack of organization in 
documenting Indian TK. As can be seen in the example above, the 
database references both the TKRC and the IPC in each 
transcription. This database will be highly useful for users and 
knowledge-holder communities to easily locate the resources. Other 
initiatives codifying TMK should consider developing their own 
methods of classification as the TKRC seems custom made for 
Indian TMK. However, such initiatives could still borrow many 
features of the TKRC in their own categorizations. If the database 
begins being used in the proactive sense to help researchers discover 
drugs more quickly, the TKRC will have the added value of 
collecting related knowledge about a specific disease. In addition to 
disclosing TMK, the TKRC will make it much easier for researchers 
to locate the TMK and the specific health issues it has been used to 
address. 
The other major lesson that could be taken from the TKDL is 
that, despite the fact that the database is available under restrictive 
licenses for the sole purpose of patent examination, efforts have 
been made to make the database more accessible, such as digitizing 
the database and translating the contents to several global 
languages.223 The content of the database has been translated into six 
languages: English, French, Spanish, German, Japanese and 
Hindi.224 The fact that the information is documented in a way that 
enables digital searches is an important element in its accessibility. 
The transcription of TMK in scientific terminologies and 
standardized measurement further adds to its accessibility. 
                                               
 222 Traditional Knowledge Resource Classification (TKRC), TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY (TKDL), http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl 
/langdefault/common/TKRC.asp?GL=Eng (last visited June 24, 2015). 
 223 TKDL, supra note 42. 
 224 Id. 
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Moreover, the codification specifies the types and quantities of 
ingredients used in creating the mixture of plant resources with brief 
instruction on how to produce them.225 This is valuable as it allows 
users to successfully replicate the traditional ways of producing the 
mixture, which is one of the first challenges in bioprospecting 
projects.226 
The TKDL has some limitations that future initiatives to codify 
TMK should attempt to minimize. A core limitation is that the 
database does not take a holistic approach in the way previously 
proposed. The information documented in the TKDL outlines only 
the types and amount of ingredients used in a resource for TMK in 
recipe format.227 It disregards the cultural, historical, environmental, 
and geographic information that could be documented together with 
the knowledge.228 As stated above, the value of codified TMK 
increases with its breadth.229 Since bioprospecting inherently 
involves unknown features of the knowledge and resource, the 
broader a codification, the greater its ability to help direct 
researchers. Additionally, the documentation of the cultural, 
environmental, and geographic context in which the knowledge has 
existed will promote other initiatives such as cultural and 
environmental preservation. 
The other major limitation of the TKDL is that it is currently 
only being used defensively to help invalidate non-inventive patent 
applications or to limit the scope of patent claims.230 Access is 
                                               
 225 See, e.g., supra Section IV.C; see also WIPO supra note 211. 
 226 Christina Lee, AncientBiotics: A Medieval Remedy for Modern Day 
Superbugs?, UNIV. OF NOTTINGHAM (March 2015), 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/news/pressreleases/2015/march/ancientbiotics---a-
medieval-remedy-for-modern-day-superbugs.aspx (discussing how the detailed 
description of an ancient medicine in a book helped modern scientists replicate its 
production). Also, the fact that reproducing the work of others being one of the 
first challenges before discovery was mentioned in personal communication with 
Dr. Jayson Parker, Lecturer in medical biotechnology in the Department of 
Biology and Institute of Biomaterials and Biomedical Engineering at the 
University of Toronto. 
 227 See, e.g., supra Section IV.C; see also TKDL, supra note 214. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 230 TKDL, supra note 42. 
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granted to patent examiners through restrictive non-disclosure 
agreements called “access agreements” signed between the Council 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (India) and the accessing patent 
offices.231 India has entered into access agreements with the 
European Patent Organization (EPO), the German Patent and 
Trademark Office (DPMA), the United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO), the United Kingdom Intellectual 
Property Office (IPO), the Canadian Intellectual Property Office 
(CIPO),232 Intellectual Property Australia (IP Australia), the 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO), the Indian Patent Office (CGPDTM), 
and the Chilean Patent Office (INAPI).233 There are slight 
differences in the restrictiveness of each access agreement.234 For 
instance, the first access agreement signed with the European Patent 
Organization states under the relevant parts that: 
Responsibilities and Obligations of User 
(i) The User shall not disclose any information of TKDL contents to 
third parties unless it is necessary for the purposes of the European patent 
grant procedure in all its phases, including the inspection of files. To this 
end, the User may, whenever required, deliver information from TKDL 
contents in whatever form to the patent applicant for the purpose of 
                                               
 231 See Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement 
between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (India) and the 
European Patent Organization, the Japanese Patent Office and the United States 
Patents and Trademarks Office (on file with author). 
 232 TKDL materials that have been used in patent examination are accessible on 
the website of the government operated patent search engine. The TKDL licenses 
state that patent offices may disclose content to third parties “only to the extent 
that it is necessary for patent search and examination.” This phrase seems to allow 
disclosure only to patent examiners and parties involved in the patent examination 
process. However, considering the practice of Western jurisdictions in publishing 
of patent examination material in publicly accessible repositories, the disclosure 
of TKDL material used in the rejection of patent application to the general public 
may still be in accordance with the TKDL licenses. Traditional Knowledge 
Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement (with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office) art. 2 (1) - Responsibilities and Obligations of USPTO. 
 233 Major Milestones, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY (TKDL), 
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/Common/AboutTKDL.asp?GL=#History 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
 234 Compare the wordings of the following agreements between the Indian 
Governments and the patent offices of the US, EU, and Japan TKDL Access 
Agreement, supra note 86. 
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citations. Except as mentioned above, the User undertakes to preserve 
the secrecy and/or confidentiality of the information. 
(ii) The User shall use TKDL information only for the purposes of the 
European patent grant procedure in all its phases including the inspection 
of files and for no other purpose. 
(iii) The User shall on a quarterly basis send the number of times content 
of TKDL was cited by the User’s examiners during the search process 
relating to published patent applications. 
(iv) Survival of obligations for maintaining the secrecy and 
confidentiality of TKDL shall remain even after the termination of this 
Agreement.235 
The access agreement with the USPTO is slightly more generous 
in that it allows the USPTO to “publicly post the search result on the 
USPTO’s Patent Application Information Retrieval System and on 
other search and examination results digital access systems.”236 This 
phrase has allowed the USPTO to post the contents of TKDL 
documentations used in patent prosecution in the US in a publicly 
accessible manner.237 Despite these differences in restriction, the 
TKDL’s orientation is defensive, and it has a goal of invalidating or 
limiting non-inventive patent applications.238 The restrictiveness of 
the database is understandable given the lack of legal protection that 
encourages proactive use. However, the current state of affairs 
misses the considerable welfare-enhancing potential that a positive 
use of databases such as the TKDL might bring about. Once there is 
a satisfactory legal regime that extends legal protection to codified 
TMK, such databases should be oriented towards positive uses of 
the knowledge documented in them. 
                                               
 235  Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, Eur.-
India, 2 (i-iv)  (on file with author). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Composition for the Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus and Metabolic 
Syndrome, USPTO (July 8, 2010), http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=/netahtml/PTO/srchnu
m.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=20100173022.PGNR.  
 238 TKDL, supra note 42. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE FOR SUBSEQUENT PATENT 
APPLICATIONS 
In many jurisdictions, if inventors (or individuals who receive 
knowledge from inventors) disclose an invention to the public 
before filing a patent, they risk having their patent application 
rejected for lack of novelty (newness).239 The disclosure of the 
invention, even if made by the inventors, would put the invention in 
the prior art category, barring it from patentability.240 Some 
jurisdictions recognize grace periods in which inventors are given a 
limited amount of time after the disclosure of the invention to apply 
for a patent.241 A grace period gives an inventor a certain amount of 
time (usually between six to twelve months)242 from the time of the 
first disclosure of the invention to apply for a patent without 
affecting the novelty of the disclosed invention. 
Given the above-described feature of patent law, a key issue that 
would arise in the implementation of the proposed bioprospecting 
rights is the implications of codifying and disclosing TMK for 
subsequent patent applications by the TK holders.243 In other words, 
should the TMK codified and disclosed by the applicant be used as 
prior art against the applicant (TK holder) in a later patent 
application by the TK holder or would the prior registration give the 
applicant the privilege of overcoming the novelty and non-
obviousness analysis? This is an important question because if TMK 
codification could subsequently be used against the applicant in a 
patent prosecution, it could disincentivize TK holders from TK 
codification and disclosure. Applicants would, in effect, be 
submitting evidence that could be used against themselves in their 
future patent applications. Therefore, the capacity of the proposed 
                                               
 239 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 240 Id. 
 241 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012); Canadian Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985, 
C. P-4), §§ 28.2(1)(a), 28.2(1)(a), 28.3. 
 242 Both the US and Canada provide a one year grace period. See Canadian 
Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985, C. P-4), §§ 28.2(1)(a), Paragraphs 28.2(1)(a), 28.3, 
http://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-4/; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012). 
 243 It should be noted that other applicants would be barred from using the 
codified TMK and therefore would not be able to apply for a patent on an 
improvement on the codified TMK until the term of the bioprospecting right 
lapses. 
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sui generis system to encourage the codification and disclosure of 
TMK by private actors depends heavily on what the effects of 
disclosure on potential exclusive rights would be. 
There are policy alternatives that could adopt a narrow or broad 
right. A system that prefers a narrow right would adopt the position 
that any disclosure will be used against the applicant as a prior art 
reference in a subsequent patent application. Here, the applicant 
would still have a head start or lead time to apply for a patent for an 
invention based on TMK because of the initial exclusive right the 
applicant would have been granted. It may be that such lead time is 
sufficient to encourage TK holders to invest in codifying and 
disclosing TMK. However, since the lead time would probably be 
an insufficient incentive, adopting a narrow right might have the 
effect of reducing the impact of the sui generis right. 
The other extreme is to take the position that the disclosure of 
TMK in a sui generis system would not have any detrimental effect 
on a subsequent patent application by the same applicant. Adopting 
such a broad right could be expected to send a strong incentivizing 
signal to applicants interested in codifying TMK. If the policy 
priority is to encourage the codification and disclosure of TMK, then 
granting broader rights could be expected to have a greater capacity 
for encouraging disclosure than a system in which the applicant 
would be submitting evidence that could prevent a subsequent 
patent application. The second system is advocated in this article. 
Since investments in the documentation and disclosure of TMK are 
expected to have significant risks, policy makers may need to 
provide a strong signal to TK-holder communities and licensees to 
invest in codification and disclosure, thus saving the body of 
knowledge from loss. 
It is worth mentioning that there are various points across this 
policy spectrum, any one of which could be adapted to reflect the 
particular policy objective of the country adopting the system. It 
should also be noted that the proposed sui generis system does not 
operate in a legal vacuum; the incentivizing effect of the proposed 
system depends on other legal and regulatory features of the country 
in question. 
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VI. BUILDING STAKEHOLDER BUY-IN 
Another important challenge the proposed system will face is 
convincing the various stakeholders to agree to the framework. First, 
the proposed system must earn the source community’s trust. 
Second, it must build confidence among bioprospectors to invest in 
the codification, disclosure, and use of TMK. And lastly, it must 
convince governments to establish the legal framework and support 
codification. 
In many countries around the world, indigenous and local 
communities have been, and in many cases continue to be, 
oppressed culturally, politically, and economically.244 Past 
experiences have forced many communities to be suspicious of 
outsiders, often for good reason. The success of the proposed sui 
generis system of TMK protection depends on the extent to which 
this distrust between knowledge-holder communities and outsiders 
can be overcome. To establish trust, the framework of TMK 
protection should enable communities to take center stage in the 
creation of the framework and other major steps along the way. If 
the framework successfully empowers knowledge-holder 
communities, they would be motivated to codify and disclose their 
knowledge. Making communities equal players in establishing the 
framework will help in the trust building process. 
One way to empower knowledge-holder communities is to give 
them effective decision-making power regarding what happens once 
their knowledge is codified and disclosed. Under a property rights 
rule, knowledge-holder communities would be able to give or refuse 
consent or to put conditions on access to the knowledge. Each 
community may have its own interests that cannot be readily 
included in any legislation. Thus, one way to make sure that these 
interests are addressed is to allow communities to refuse consent if 
they find a proposed licensing agreement to be insufficient. Terms 
and conditions of a licensing agreement can include economic and 
non-economic benefits or obligations. While communities that seek 
                                               
 244 State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ECON. & SOC. AFF. (2009), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf; 
see also M. Annette Jaimes, THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA : GENOCIDE, 
COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE (RACE & RESISTANCE SERIES) (1992). 
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to receive benefits from their knowledge could do so, those that 
prefer to give it away freely may choose not to exercise their rights. 
Giving communities the power to set terms and conditions of access 
would convince communities that have non-economic interests or 
values to buy into the system. 
Bioprospectors are another important stakeholder group. Since 
some (if not most) knowledge-holder communities will not be able 
to finance the codification and disclosure of TMK, they would need 
partners who can support them in such an endeavor. The support of 
the private sector is essential to complement government support, 
especially in cases where government support is largely lacking. 
Bioprospectors would be encouraged to partner with knowledge-
holder communities through the incentive of a bioprospecting right 
they could benefit from once they enter into an agreement with the 
source community. Additionally, since the confusing state of affairs 
relating to liabilities for the use of TMK in bioprospecting projects 
raises the transaction costs involved, a clear framework that sets out 
the obligation of stakeholders will benefit users as well. The 
combination of these incentives would encourage bioprospectors to 
buy into the proposed system. 
A central issue for users is why user-countries would agree to 
set up a legal framework that would further restrict the ability of 
persons within their jurisdiction to access TMK. The troubling 
protectionist trend in which TK holders are increasingly becoming 
restrictive in terms of granting access to their knowledge may be 
what encourages user-countries to buy into the framework. The 
current practice of gaining access to TMK without sharing any 
benefits with the knowledge providing communities does not seem 
to be sustainable in the long term. Provider countries and 
communities have already started restricting access to their 
knowledge because of the lack of protection.245 The protectionist 
trend (and the potential for increasing restrictions on access to 
TMK) should encourage users—and, more importantly, their 
                                               
 245 Carvalho, supra note 33, at 245–47 (stating that indigenous and local 
communities are becoming secretive and listing national attempts to restrict 
access to TK); Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 4, at 757–65 (outlining national 
legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, The Philippines, and the 
Africa model legislation). 
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governments—to agree to shift to a system that rewards knowledge 
holders. 
Even if users could evade these restrictions and access TMK, it 
might increase the cost of future access to the knowledge since 
knowledge holders will try to further restrict access. On the other 
hand, providing clear and effective rights to TMK would facilitate 
access to it, thereby reducing costs associated with using TMK. 
Here, a race for access might encourage user country governments 
to compete in setting up such systems with the goal of receiving 
preferred access to TMK. In conclusion, the proposed system might 
attract user countries because it would facilitate the use of TMK by 
individuals, institutions, and businesses in their jurisdictions. It is 
also the more feasible route for the long-term access to TMK. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
After providing some introductory concepts about TK, this 
article situated TK in the public goods literature. Doing so allowed 
for the established economic concepts regarding public goods to be 
applied in examining alternative governance frameworks for TK. 
This article assessed the potential benefits and limitations of four of 
the common channels used in supporting investments in the 
production of knowledge goods in general in the context of TK. 
Each alternative framework has advantages and disadvantages, and 
a combination of these channels seems to be the more suitable 
approach for addressing the complex interests and scenarios present 
in the attempt to encourage investment in TK codification and 
disclosure. 
In the case of “modern” knowledge, the recognition of private 
rights plays a key role in encouraging investments in knowledge 
generation and distribution. Following from this understanding, the 
recognition of private rights as an alternative legal framework for 
TMK codification and disclosure is outlined. It outlines the features 
of a bioprospecting right that balances the interests of the 
stakeholders involved. The bioprospecting right is a cluster of rights 
emanating from bioprospecting activity based on TMK. The right 
will be granted to source communities that codify their TMK either 
in publicly accessible databases or in restricted databases to which 
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a government agency or other entity would have access. The article 
discussed two alternative rights for TMK codified in a publicly 
accessible database, each with advantages and disadvantages. The 
first alternative is the granting of an exclusive right to conduct 
bioprospecting activities. This option grants a powerful right to 
source communities with the power to veto any bioprospecting 
projects based on the codified TMK. While such a strong right 
would encourage investments in the codification and disclosure of 
TMK, it involves a risk because it may encourage source 
communities to over claim. The second alternative is the recognition 
of a right to share benefits from bioprospecting projects conducted 
by others. This second alternative, which only grants rights to share 
profits, involves lesser incentives to over claim and may encourage 
users to engage in bioprospecting projects with fewer transaction 
costs. While policy makers are encouraged to adopt a suitable 
framework for their jurisdiction, the second framework is preferred 
in this article. The transaction cost of using TMK in bioprospecting 
projects is lower in the second alternative since users are not 
required to negotiate with source communities ex ante, while source 
communities would still be able to share from the resulting profits. 
To benefit from the bioprospecting right, applicants have to 
fulfill four core requirements: that the applicant either be the 
knowledge-holder community or a licensee of such community; that 
licensees sign an equitable benefit-sharing agreement with the 
knowledge-holder community; that the applicant clearly describes 
the knowledge being claimed; and that the knowledge should not be 
widely diffused. 
While a specific term of these rights has not been provided, this 
article examined the key factors that policy makers should consider 
in designing the scope of the right. These include existing terms for 
intellectual property rights, database protection, and domaine public 
payant. Furthermore, the article also provided a hypothetical and 
actual example of TMK codification to help policy makers craft an 
appropriate protection regime. The establishment of a holistic 
codification that includes the details of TMK and its socio-cultural 
environment should be encouraged. The article concludes by 
examining the implications of TK codification and disclosure on 
subsequent patent applications and ways in which the 
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bioprospecting right could build the interests of diverse 
stakeholders. 
A carefully crafted bioprospecting right will facilitate 
partnerships between source communities and users, thereby 
creating a more efficient and sustainable bioprospecting industry. 
Furthermore, the legal framework has the potential to save 
considerable TMK from loss through codification and disclosure. 
As a result, there are strong welfare-enhancing outcomes that can be 
expected from the establishment of an effective system of protection 
for TMK. 
 
